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This thesis studies the relationship between budget
assertiveness and budget success in various Department of Defense
budget accounts. It covers the budget formulation and
Congressional enactment phase. It presents a model to discuss
determinants of budget success and then focuses on one major
component of success, assertiveness, defined as the percentage
increment requested. The percentage increment appropriated is
shown to be significantly correlated with the percentage increment
requested. The budget accounts which seem to be most rewarded by
budget assertiveness for Fiscal Years 1977 - 1988 are Procurement,
Marine Corps; the four services' Military Personnel accounts; Other
Procurement^ Air Force; and Other Procurement, Army. The budget
accounts which seem least responsive to budget assertiveness are
Aircraft Procurement, Navy; Weapons Procurement, Navy; and
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
This thesis studies the relationship between budget assertive-
ness and budget success for fiscal years 1977 - 1988. A model is
designed to study the correlation between the amount of the annual
percentage change requested in an agency' s budget to the amount of
the percentage change appropriated with regard to a common base-
line. The strength of the relationship will be used to suggest a
budget strategy most likely to contribute to growth.
The relationship between government agencies and their budget
reviewers is explored. The thesis argues that ardent program
advocacy serves the public interest because 1) agencies are best
able to determine their capabilities; 2) competition among public
agencies for scarce resources trims the fat; and 3) budget
reviewers are better able to determine a program' s marginal
contribution if they have more information. It is hypothesized
that aggressive budget requests--within a certain range--will
result in either larger growth of DoD's budget accounts or more
efficient allocation among them, or both.
B. IDENTIFICATION OF HYPOTHESIS
There are many variables--political, socioeconomic, and
military--that determine the degree of budget success for the
Department of Defense (DoD)
. This thesis hypothesizes that growth
in the DoD budget and within the various budget accounts is highly
related to the degree of assertiveness displayed in the budget
formulation and Congressional enactment phase.
The study compares budget request increments to the actual
increments appropriated, as a percentage of a common base. This
thesis is not intended to explain or predict an annual level of
defense expenditures, but rather an annual increment. Success is
measured not in terms of what percentage of the budget request is
appropriated, but in terms of what percentage increment is
appropriated over the base.
The primary research question is whether an agency is better off
to ask for a large annual increment to its budget, or rather to
request the amount it reasonably expects to receive. Subsidiary
research questions include the efficacy of assertiveness with
regard to agency credibility and public support for the long term.
The reasons for a proposed budget change--f iscal, programmatic,
or other--are not addressed in this thesis. This thesis concen-
trates on Congressional action regarding the percentage aimount of
budget change
.
For purposes of this thesis, "agency" refers to departments and
establishments of the Federal Government.
II . BACKGROUND
A. BUDGET CONCEPTS
This section synopsizes the federal budget process with an
emphasis on defense. The advanced reader may skip this section and
proceed to Section B - Survey of Related Literature.
The fiscal year for the federal government runs from 1 October
through 30 September. For example, Fiscal Year 1992 will commence
1 October 1991 and end 30 September 1992. It is abbreviated as FY
92.
The Office of Management and Budget (0MB) consolidates all
departments' budgets for the President. The President submits this
budget to Congress by the first Monday after the third of January,
e.g., the FY 92 budget must be submitted by 7 January 1991. The
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and other Defense agencies
submit their budget requests to the Office of Secretary of Defense
(OSD) significantly before then. All executive branch agencies
must have their FY 92 budgets to 0MB by 1 September 1990, DoD,
unique among the Departments, has submitted a biennial budget for
FY 88/89 and FY 90/91, although Congress has yet to enact a two-
year budget. In any event, biennial budgeting is not relevant to
this thesis.
Continuing the example, if today is 25 December 1990, then FY 92
is called the Budget Year (BY) / FY 91 is the Current Year (CY) ; and
FY 90 is the Past Year (PY)
.
DoD uses a particular form of budgeting called the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) . The Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) design plans to counter the military threat to the
United States. The services propose programs to meet JCS plans.
Upon initial approval of programs by the Secretary of Defense, the
services prepare detailed budget estimates that fulfill the
program. The service comptrollers breakdown their component budget
estimates and "crosswalk" or amalgamate the estimates into
appropriation accounts. The annual DoD Appropriations Act provides
funds by title, account, and line item.
Table 1 identifies the major FY 77 - 88 component accounts
within the Department of Defense--Military appropriations titles.
Brackets [ ] enclose those accounts which no longer exist.
Brackets [ ] with a fiscal year inside show the last year for which
budget authority was appropriated. Braces { } show the first
fiscal year the newer accounts were established. Definitions used
by DoD and Congressional appropriations language have essentially
remained the same for the years studied in this thesis.
Explanations of the major Defense appropriations are provided in
the Budget of the United States Government, Appendix and are
summarized at the end of the table.
TABLE 1





Military Personnel, Marine Corps




Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps
Reserve Personnel, Air Force
National Guard Personnel, Army
National Guard Personnel, Air Force
[RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL]
[Retired Pay, Defense] [1984]
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
Operation and Maintenance, Army
Operation and Maintenance, Navy
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps
Operation and Maintenance, Air Force
Operation and Maintenance, Defense Agencies
Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve
Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve
Operation and Maintenance, Air Force Reserve
Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard
Operation and Maintenance, Air National Guard
Civilian and Military Pay Raises {1987}
TABLE 1 (Cont'd)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS
PROCUREMENT
[Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army] [1971]
Aircraft Procurement, Army {1972}
Missile Procurement, Army {1972}
Procurement of Weapons
and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army {1972}
Procurement of Ammunition, Army {1972}
Other Procurement, Army {1972}
[Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles, Navy] [1973]
Aircraft Procurement, Navy {1974}
Weapons Procurement, Navy {1974}
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
Other Procurement, Navy
Procurement, Marine Corps
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force
Missile Procurement, Air Force
Other Procurement, Air Force
Procurement, Defense Agencies
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Air Force
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense Agencies
[Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense] [1986]
Developmental Test and Evaluation, Defense {1987}
Operational Test and Evaluation, Defense {1987}
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION*
FAMILY HOUSING, DEFENSE*
REVOLVING AND MANAGEMENT FUNDS*
*See Budget of the United States Government, Appendix for
further breakdown of these accounts.
TABLE 1 (Cont'd)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS
MILITARY PERSONNEL appropriations provide for the pay and
allowances of officers, enlisted personnel, cadets, and
midshipmen; the subsistence of enlisted personnel; permanent
change of station travel; and other military personnel costs.
Beginning in 1985, these appropriations also finance the future
retirement benefits of the current active forces. Changes in
financial requirements are primarily related to military
personnel strengths in support of the military programs. The
budget request for Military Personnel does not include pay
raises
.
The RETIRED PAY, DEFENSE appropriation included funds for
the pay of all personnel on the military retired lists for the
Department of Defense. Included were the consolidated
requirements of the military departments for: (a) payments to
retired officers and enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force; (b) retainer pay of enlisted
personnel of the Fleet Reserve of the Navy and Marine Corps;
and (c) survivors' benefits. As a result of the change to
accrual accounting for military retirement enacted in the 1984
Defense Authorization Act (PL 98 - 94), this appropriation was
discontinued in 1985 and a Military Retirement Trust Fund was
established within the Department of Defense--Civil account.
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE (O&M) appropriations finance the
day-to-day costs, except military personnel costs, of operating
and maintaining the Armed Forces. These funds include amounts
for pay of civilians, contract services for maintenance of
equipment and facilities, fuel, supplies, and repair parts for
weapons and equipment. Financial requirements for these
appropriations are influenced by a variety of factors, the
principal of which are force levels, such as the number of
aircraft squadrons or Army or Marine Corps divisions, military
strength and deployments, rates of operational activities,
number of installations, and cfuantity and complexity of major




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS
PROCUREMENT appropriations finance the acquisition of large
dollar value combat, combat support, and training and
communications equipment; air, ground, and ship munitions;
major items for support of equipment when it is in use;
industrial facilities necessary to produce that equipment; and
major modifications of on-hand equipment where increased
capability can be achieved without buying new equipment . The
equipment financed by these appropriations is bought primarily
from private contractors or, when necessary, produced in
government arsenals, shipyards, and plants.
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION (RDT&E) programs
support the modernization of the Armed Forces through a broad
range of activities. In addition to development and testing of
full-scale, pre-production hardware, these prograims insure that
the United States and its allies maintain a distinct
technological advantage over potential adversaries through
development of prototype hardware, fabrication of technology-
demonstration devices and support of military research and
exploratory development. Work is performed by industrial
contractors, government laboratories, universities, and non-
profit organizations. Research and development programs are
normally funded so that each year's resources support one
year's increment of the total program cost.
The President is required to submit a Current Services Estimate
when he submits his budget request, the definition and purpose of
which is described in 0MB Circular No. A-11:
. .
.
the proposed budget authority and estimated outlays that
would be included in the budget if all programs and activities
were carried on at the same level as in the fiscal year in pro-
gress and without policy changes in such programs and activi-
ties (31 U.S.C. 1109(a)). This current services information,
together with supporting information, such as economic assump-
tions and program caseloads, is used to assess the size and
direction of the budget and as a base against which alterna-
tives, including the President's budget proposals, can be
evaluated. (1988, p. 61)
Submission of the President's Budget to Congress ends the Budget
Formulation phase and begins the Congressional Enactment phase.
The major Congressional committee players during this phase are the
Budget, Appropriations, and Authorizations committees. Throughout
the process, agency heads and other experts present their views on
the President's Budget at committee and subcommittee hearings.
Differences in bills passed by the House or Senate are resolved by
an ad hoc Conference Committee before they can be sent to the
President for signature. Once signed, the appropriations and
authorizations bills become law--and with regard to DoD are
referred to as the DoD Authorization Act, 19XX and the DoD
Appropriations Act, 19XX for the appropriate fiscal year.
Prior to considering authorization and appropriations measures,
the House and Senate pass a Corjcurrent Resolution on the Budget
which sets forth appropriate levels of budget authority and outlays
by major function, e.g., national defense, international affairs,
etc. The Concurrent Resolution on the Budget ostensibly is a
legislative device for the Congress to regulate itself. Beginning
with FY 87, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings makes the budget resolution
totals immediately binding on the Congress. It is not a law and
does not require a presidential signature.
The authorization process establishes federal programs to
respond to national needs. The Senate has 16 authorizing
committees; the House has 19. The Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC) and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) are the
standing authorization committees for defense programs. The Senate
and House Appropriations Committees (SAC/ HAC) are responsible for
creating budget authority and to fund those programs created by the
authorization committees. Each chamber has one appropriations
committee with various subcommittees whose jurisdiction roughly
corresponds to that of the authorizing committees.
The reader is cautioned not to confuse budget authority with the
authorization process. When Congress appropriates funds for a
program, it is creating budget authority, i.e., legal authority for
an agency to enter into obligations which will result in outlays.
For most DoD programs, budget authority becomes available each year
only as voted by the Congress in annual appropriations acts; this
is called current budget authority. The Military Retirement Trust
Fund is an example of a program with permanent budget authority,
under which funds become available annually without further
Congressional action.
Outlays are disbursements by the Treasury, e.g., the actual
issuance of a check. They occur in the same or subsequent years
that DoD obligates its funds. For example, ninety eight percent of
Military Personnel monies are paid out the same year as the
obligation; Procurement experiences a slower outlay rate because
contractor bills are paid only as construction progresses. The
deficit is calculated as Outlays minus Revenues.
This thesis is concerned with Congressional behavioral response
to DoD budget assertiveness and hence will deal primarily with
budget authority.
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B. SURVEY OF RELATED LITERATURE
1. Schools of Thought: "Assertiveness" vs "Realism"
This subsection suminarizes the basic arguments for and
against agency assertiveness--sometimes called advocacy or
acquisitiveness--from a broad array of literature (national
strategy, political economy, and public administration) , and
suggests a consensus view. Subsection 2 will summarize the
findings of previous studies regarding the efficacy of agency
assertiveness
.
Assertiveness, the focus of this thesis, may be defined as
the tendency for agencies to pursue an active strategy of expansion
in their programs and fundings (LeLoup 1978, p. 233) . Some poli-
tical scientists assert that agency self-advocacy and assertiveness
aid decision makers in providing efficient, effective, and equit-
able resource allocation among public services (Wildavsky 1988)
.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was noted for his
recalcitrance in his quest for budgetary resources. Critics
admonished that DoD would have fared better in budget deliberations
if the Secretary would have been "realistic". Rudolph Penner,
Congressional Budget Office Director from September 1983 to April
1987, opines that the Pentagon's refusal to delineate priorities is
a cause for legitimate complaint by Congress, because they probably
could have cut more efficiently if they had more precise
recommendations from the military (Clark 1987) . Others have
suggested that agency heads should heed the new political climate.
11
volunteer to tighten their belts, and submit realistic budgets.
(Morrison 1986; Carrington 1987)
However, there is no mechanism where an agency head can
properly determine some other agency's program to be more or less
beneficial to the nation than his own program, or, borrowing a term
from economic theory, its marginal contribution. Cabinet officials
are appointed by the President to shepherd his interests in that
area; additionally, they take an oath to preserve, protect, and
defend the U.S. Constitution. Secretary Weinberger's axiom was
that as you decrease the defense budget, you increasingly put
national security at risk. He would have been remiss to suggest we
can maintain national security no matter what the defense budget.
Total comprehension of the activities and budgets of the
four services are beyond the ability of any human legislator, "so
the executive and legislative officers focus most of their review
on the proposed increments and reveal their priorities by approving
different proportions of these." (Niskanen 1971, p. 40)
What is needed is not a compromise on defense spending but a
consensus on what national security requires. Intense budget deli-
berations provide a framework for that consensus, ensure that funds
are spent prudently, and efficiently equalize the marginal return
to diverse government expenditures. Since the federal budget is a
mechanism for formulating and implementing policy, all budgetary
decisions with policy implications should be made at as high a lev-
el as practicable. The responsibility for determining realistic
budgets should rest with budget reviewers, not budget submitters.
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A senior research fellow at the Hoover Institute puts the
policy implications of either school of thought this way:
The problem of accounting for the role of administrative agen-
cies in a democratic system has concerned students of the diverse
fields of administrative law, public administration, and American
politics. From the standpoint of each of these scholarly pursuits,
the proper balance between the exercise of administrative
discretion and legislative policy formation is hard to strike. Is
an agency merely to act as a neutral "transmission belt"
translating the legal expressions of the legislature into decisions
on particular cases? Or is it instead supposed to operate a
surrogate political process that has the purpose and effect of
"adjusting policy?" And, if it turns out that the second
possibility is the only practical one, what then becomes the
distinction between the legislative and administrative processes?
(Ferejohn 1987, p. 455)
Davis, et al . (1966) suggest that agencies generate
increased expenditures through advocacy, but that their credibility
will suffer a drastic decline if they ask for amounts much larger
than the appropriating bodies believe reasonable. While not
proving or disproving this statement, empirical analysis of recent
budgetary data as presented in this thesis does suggest boundaries
for assertiveness for various DoD accounts.
Budgetary decision making calls for a division of labor much
like Adam Smith's pin factory. Historically, the agency plays the
role of advocate. Wildavsky (1988) argues that we should continue
this as no one understands agency programs better than the agency
itself. Agency directors aid the budget review and policy manage-
ment process by forcefully advocating their specific programs.
Defense policy expert Roger Hilsman (1987) notes:
The function that [political appointees] perform is to
analyze problems in their area of responsibility, to recommend
policy to deal with those problems, and to attempt to build
support for their recommendations--in a word, to be the
advocates of policy, (p. 153)
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The military have been given responsibility for the nation's
security, and it is their duty to fight hard for strong
defenses, large armies, navies, and air forces, and the latest,
most powerful, and most sophisticated weapons, (p. 310)
Policy setters--Congress and the President--can best set
priorities and ascribe their marginal values if given all available
information and arguments. In the context of top management
appraisal capability, a Navy management review noted the following
with regard to information systems:
Adequate information is essential to the executive. On it
he bases his decisions; through it he communicates these
decisions to others. Thus, it is through information channels
that the executive establishes and maintains control over his
organization. Information ties the various management
processes and operating functions into a meaningful whole.
(U.S. Navy 1962, p. 67)
A political scientist from the University of Washington
argues the productivity enhancing effect of competition this way:
Competition, rivalry, and advocacy are all there to be used
by the decision maker. The fundamental argument is that it is
in the self-interest of a principal decision maker to place
subordinates in competition so as to gain from the interplay of
their self-interest. Bureaucracy often tries to minimize
competition, to have tables of organization and clear
functional that emphasize cooperation. But the organizational
neatness that makes for order in the life of the bureaucrat can
render the organization complacent or arrogant toward criticism
and questioning. Too much cooperation within can be deadening.
The threat of scrutiny and challenge should be there, both from
within and without. (Williams 1986, p. 59)
Inter-agency rivalry harnesses the benefits of competition
within the government as suggested by an economist
:
Rather than seeing harmony, trancjuility, and placidity as
pleasing social and economic conditions, [economists] view them
as omens of possible stagnation and lethargy. As long as
irritation arises from informed presentation of alternative
courses of economic choice, there seems little reason to attach
as much distaste to it as we now do. (Patterson 1964, p. 13)
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Public programs are ostensibly initiated to increase citizen
welfare. They are an expression of political values, an allocation
and distribution of specific, limited public resources (Mokwa 1981,
p. 83) . Successful public administrators (budget submitters) mix
political management with technical management to attain increased
funds which ostensibly increases their probability of mission
success
.
At first glance it seems that such a free-for-all approach
will lead to a no-holds-barred budget grab by federal agencies and
increase interservice rivalry. However, it is this very competi-
tion for resources that will force all participants to fully
scrutinize their programs in the course of preparing budget
justifications. Decision makers (budget reviewers with a bias to
cutting) are confronted with a myriad of choices to provide for the
public interest. They are also influenced by various forces--a
fight for reelection, internal organizational politics, perception
of public need--as they make decisions on different programs.
While attempting to prevail in the budget struggle, the
self-interested manager will be providing hard evidence to budget
reviewers and enabling more prudent decision making. This modifies
incrementalist theory which asserts that this year's budget is a
function of last year's with all agencies receiving their fair
share of the increment. Increased advocacy in the budget process
permits a thorough review of any agency' s requested increment and a
rigorous comparison with other programs without a turn towards
zero-based budgeting.
15
Recent literature suggests that legislatures should not
reveal their demand preferences for agency output to the agency.
This demand uncertainty aids the legislature in its oversight
responsibility because it restrains an agency from either
exploiting its expertise, or misrepresenting its output capability
(Bendor 1985; Miller 1983) . Agency officials do not and cannot
know for sure what will happen at Congressional appropriations
hearings (LeLoup 1984, p. 85) . In this paradigm, agencies must play
the complementary role of providing Congress with all applicable
information. Congressman Les Aspin (1973, p. 81) asserts: "The
overriding issue in defense can be reduced to a simple,
straightforward question ... How much is enough?"
Lieutenant Jack Housley, United States Navy (1986)
,
concludes the following on proper claimant strategies:
The most important strategy available to a claimant is to
ask for a budget increase. Budget changes are most closely
related to the budget requested by the claimant than to the
budget changes made by NAVCOMPT or OSD/OMB. The support of the
reviewing bodies helps maintain budget changes requested. But
first a claimant must request an increase or no budget increase
will be forthcoming, (p. 40)
Given that you should ask for a budget increase, this thesis
addresses how much to ask for and how to ask for it. It will
discuss to what degree an assertive budget request affects an
agency's resources.
2 . Previous Studies on Budget. Success
Lance T. LeLoup (1978, p. 232) decries the "dearth of
empirical evidence on the actual behavior, role, and strategies of
individual agencies, departments and the Office of Management and
16
Budget." This section surveys the literature on budget success
(most of which appears to be less than two decades old)
.
Ira Sharkansky (1968) has shown that aggressiveness is a
prerequisite for a substantial budget increase. Sharkansky also
finds a high correlation between gubernatorial support and agency
budget success. It seems to be a safe extrapolation to further
suggest that presidential support of an initiative--budgetary or
otherwise— is essential for federal agency success. Sharkansky'
s
research only covered one fiscal year, and the resultant budget
increases could have been a result of a favorable climate for
increased government spending. Housley (1986) tracked Operations
and Maintenance, Navy budget requests over three years (FY 1985 -
87) concluding that the most assertive agencies came away with the
most substantial, non-incremental changes in appropriations.
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1966) studied non-defense
federal agency budgets finding that this year's budget can be mod-
eled as a percentage of last year's budget plus a random variable.
Natchez and Bupp (1973) note that Davis et al . ignore the
competition among alternative programs in their formulation of
simple linear decision rules:
. . . the budgetary process produces a climate of scarcity in
which the success of those who participate is measured by the
number of dollars they are able to win. Indeed, the entire
process of formulating budgets within agencies plays upon the
institutional interests of bureaucrats so as to produce the
explicit competition between alternative "policies." (p. 953)
Priorities are established by aggressive entrepreneurs at
the operating levels of government. Programs prosper because
energetic division directors successfully build political
support to withstand continuous attacks upon a program's
resource base by competing claims, (p. 963)
17
They imply that it is the President's administration--the program
directors and operating-level bureaucrats--who set policy, and the
role of the President is that of "dispute-settling".
Terry (1973) and Wood (1975) buttress Davis' et al . con-
tention that the non-defense appropriations process may be modeled
by simple (basically incremental) decision rules and is equally
applicable to defense budgeting. Wood (p. 96) shows linear regres-
sion analysis to be feasible with only one decision variable, ex-
cept for the Procurement account, disaggregated below the Service
level, and finds little improvement in model fit when adjusting for
inflation
.
Richard Fenno (1966, ch . 8) discusses the two measures used
by Appropriations Committee members: 1) the percentage of the
agency's budget estimate approved by the Committee, and 2) the
comparison of what the Committee approves this year with what they
approved last year, i.e., the increment expressed as a percentage
of last year's appropriation. He finds no correlation (ir = 0.0)
between the two measures for the agencies studied. Fenno finds
that the agencies with the highest growth rates for fiscal years
1947 through 1962 also have the biggest appropriations appetites
and suggests that growth is a function of appetite. He states that
the House Appropriations Committee's dominant response to agency
requests is to "grant an increase over the previous year's
appropriation but, at the same time, to reduce their estimates."
(p. 410) In this thesis, we equate Fenno' s "appropriations
appetite" and "growth" with budget assertiveness and success.
Kanter (1972) finds that Congressional activity, measured by
the dollar amount and frequency of changes to the President's
budget, have been concentrated in Procurement and RDT&E with less
Congressional involvement in Military Personnel
.
Korb (1972) and Blackmon (1975) corroborate Kanter'
s
findings although Korb is not so ready to conclude that Congres-
sional activity on the defense budget is primarily programmatic.
Korb suggests that Congressional action is more fiscal within the
Procurement and RDT&E programs in that they rarely cancel a program
outright, but merely delay it.
Anderson (1983) analyzes growth in the four major
appropriations titles with respect to their changing shares of the
total defense budget. He finds that, as a percentage share basis
of the DoD Budget, Operation and Maintenance and Military Personnel
have the lowest volatility from year to year regardless of DoD's
overall budget success. Procurement takes the largest share of the
increment when DoD budget success is high. When budget success is
low. Research, Development, Training, and Evaluation (RDT&E) seems
to maintain its relative share of the budget the best among the
four titles, holding steady at 9 to 10 percent of the total.
Shockley (1985) focuses on the political persuasion exerted
on Congress by the Executive branch (SECDEF and the President) . He
shows that in years of top growth (measured as the net percentage
change in DoD outlays and GNP) , the President's budget message
and/or witnesses in Congressional hearings characterized current
military strength as "inadequate." In contrast, current military
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strength was characterized as "adequate" for the ten distinct
fiscal years that Shockley determined to be marked by stable or
declining DoD budgets relative to GNP growth.
Congressional resource allocation has several dimensions
—
technical and political--and merits attention. This thesis will
study and disaggregate the DoD budget below the appropriations
title level, analyzing the performance of specific budget accounts.
It will thus avoid the criticism directed at those analyses which
used the entirety of the DoD budget as the "base".
C. MODELING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET SUCCESS'
Some of the literature presents formal models to explain U.S.
defense expenditure decision making. These models are often too
theoretical for more than occasional use in DoD and not
particularly useful to the practitioner. This thesis investigates
the simple rule of thumb "he who asks for more, gets more" through
development of an empirical model.
First, we recognize that one responsibility of the Secretary of
Defense is to obtain the optimum amount of resources that will
protect the interests of the United States throughout the world.
That includes enough resources in the short term to counter any
immediate threat, and sufficient resources over the long term which
will permit a prudent defense at minimum impact to the national
economy
.
'l am indebted to Giordano, Frank R. and Maurice D. Weir, A First Course
in Mathematical Modeling, Monterey: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1985,
which forms the basis for this section.
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Since the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the sole
responsibility and authority to appropriate resources for the
national defense, we seek to identify those factors that induce
Congress to provide the amount of resources we deem necessary to
carry out our responsibilities. For example, federal agencies
experience varying degrees of success in increasing their budgets;
we can conjecture reasons for that success such as constituent
interests, public consensus, and agency assertiveness
.
We are interested in understanding how sensitive Congress is to
certain variables in the appropriations--or resource allocation--
process. As discussed in Section B, there is little agreement on
what those variables are, let alone their relative importance. We
cannot hold all but one variable constant and observe Congressional
reaction as we change that one variable, and then repeat the
process for each variable, one at a time, to draw a definitive
conclusion. We can, however, identify the primary factors involved
in the resource allocation decision making process, and conjecture
tentative relationships among the factors, thereby constructing a
rough "model" of Congressional behavior. We can then apply
mathematical analysis to our model, and interpret how closely our
mathematical conclusions approximate real-world behavior.
Model building is an iterative process. We may decide our model
is unwieldy and simplify it by willingly ignoring less significant
varicJDles, combining several variables together, or making other
simplifying assumptions (such as a linear relationship among some
of the variables) . On the other hand, we may decide the model is
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too ambiguous and needs refinement, i.e., the addition of more
variables, to better capture the real world situation.
Giordano and Weir (1985) suggest that a model may be evaluated
across three main characteristics:
• Fidelity: the preciseness of a model's representation of
reality.
• Cost: the total cost of the modeling process.
• Flexibility: the ability to change and control conditions
affecting the model as required data is gathered.
The mathematical model developed in this thesis suffers a loss
in fidelity: a severe simplification of the resource allocation
decision making process is necessary to make the problem tractable.
This doesn't necessarily mean that the model is of little use; it
still provides a basis to draw valid conclusions about budget
account activity. On the other hand, our model is not costly in
that it is within the scope of a master' s thesis and readily usable
by anyone with a personal computer. Moreover, our model is
generously flexible in that any number of variables or assumptions
may be introduced. This trade-off between precision and simplicity
permits the application of a simple rule-of -thumb, allows DoD users
to update the model as empirical data becomes available, and
permits other users to customize the model for their own agency.
We have identified our problem to be that of obtaining the
necessary monies from Congress to defend the United States. (The
delineation of exactly what it takes to "defend the United States"
will be left to others) . We now list those things that influence
the behavior of Congressional resource allocation:
• agency aggressiveness or assertiveness
• agency program synchronization with President's ideology
• agency program synchronization with Congress' ideology
22
• interactive strategy implementation contingent on the seas of
change in Congress
• publicity seeking behavior of Congress
• publicity seeking behavior of agency
• electoral cycle
• constituent needs
• depth and quality of agency marketing effort




• industry and citizen lobbies
• percentage of military voter participation
• reputation/expertise of agency head
• amount of Washington time in career of agency head
• quality and sincerity of agency head's presentation at
hearing
• Congress' confidence in agency head/agency
• agency's past and current performance (or non-performance)
• degree of agency/agency head' s honesty with Congress
• how well agency spent last year's funds
• how well agency spent last year's increment
• agency transfers and reprogramming actions
• number and dollar amounts of appropriation lapses
• analysis of costs/benefits
• degree to which agency used money appropriated in the
previous year for purposes (initially) not authorized by the
committee
• degree to which hearings witness acquiesced to Member'
s
inquiries about feasibility of cuts
• economic outlook
• budget deficits
• cost of inputs to Department of Defense
• rate of increase or size of federal revenues
• defense budgets of allies
• perceived Soviet or other foreign threat
• "breakout" of peace
We consider all variables in this list to be independent, while
the one variable we hope to explain, the actual increment
appropriated expressed as a percentage over the current base, is
considered dependent.
We neglect some variables such as cost/benefit analysis because
their effects are relatively small compared to other variables.
Other variables, such as agency head sincerity or honesty, are
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ignored in our simplified model because they are too difficult to
quantify. If it turns out they are significant to the outcome,
they could be incorporated later into a more refined model
.
We will further reduce the complexity of the problem by making
the following assumptions about the DoD budgeting process and
interrelationships between the variables:
(1) Congress begins the appropriations process only after
receiving the President's Budget; this assumption permits greater
weight on the importance of executive agency behavior in
considering the budget.
(2) All budget requests submitted to Congress are reasonably
substantiated and justified. This assumption is not unreasonable
as agency heads and program managers usually will not risk their
reputations by submitting a frivolous budget. Furthermore, by the
time an agency's budget reaches Congress, it has been thoroughly
scrutinized by the Service and DoD comptrollers and the Office of
Management and Budget (0MB) . This assumption dismisses the
possibility of pie-in-the-sky requests and imposes responsible
assertiveness
.
(3) DoD officials must demonstrate accomplishment and
productivity with past dollars expended to attain future dollars,
particularly for military readiness, sustainability , and support
costs, where there may be no specifically focused constituency.
Budget sizing decisions become easy targets that are very difficult
to defend against competent and cost-conscious congressional
staffs; so there is an increased need for well-researched and
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empirically based cost-effectiveness relationships for long-term
government marketing programs. (Martin 197 9, p. 91)
(4) The Appropriations Committee does not, as a rule, probe
deeply into well-established programs with well-established bases
of support. What it normally does is to check carefully what the
agency did with the increase it was given last year and inquire
into the purposes for which the current increase is used.
(LeLoup 1984, p. 91)
(5) Previous studies (DSMC 1983) have shown no correlation
between Soviet military spending and Congressional appropriations.^
(6) The Congressman faces the problem of allocating resources
among many agency programs of enormous complexity and seeks a
heuristic mechanism to aid in this decision process.
(7) The components of the DoD budget are formulated long before
the proposed budget year and before final results are in on the
"past year" or "current year". The Office of Management and Budget
(0MB) conducts joint reviews of the Services' budgets with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) . The use of final budget
figures in this study obscures the pre-OMB/OSD budget struggle that
occurs amongst and within the four Services--and may leaven the
assertiveness factor somewhat. However, the 0MB submittal to
Congress combines relative Presidential support for various
programs with the DoD dollar requests and serves to counteract the
leveling of assertiveness at the OSD level.
^See Looney (1988) for a different conclusion; see Mintz (1988, ch. 3)
and Marra (1985) for a survey of studies showing conflicting evidence for this
theory.
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(8) We ignore the implication of Congressional reaction to DoD
implementation of the "Assertiveness Model" developed in this
thesis. Wood's preliminary testing showed little statistical
significance for a refined interactive model (Wood 1975, p. 33,
note 3)
.
We have now arrived at the model:
Budget success = f (budget assertiveness)
Solving and interpreting this model is discussed in Sections III
and IV.
Is our model valid? Given the past studies conducted on budget
success, we sense a certain agreement that the more assertive
agencies obtain more funds than those who are not, and this squares
with common sense. We would also expect that appropriations are an
increasing function of assertiveness. Given the empirical basis of
our model construction, we will need to be careful in that future
appropriation increments can be predicted safely only within the
range of the actual data utilized in our model.
The thesis will now analyze assertiveness as a suggested
determinant of budget success, and quantify and suggest reasons




The budget data for this study has been derived from the Budget
of the United States Government, Appendix for Fiscal Years 1977
through 1989. Table 2 lists those DoD budget accounts chosen for
analysis with abbreviations used in this thesis.
TABLE 2




Military Personnel, Marine Corps
Military Personnel, Air Force
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
Operation and Maintenance, Army
Operation and Maintenance, Navy
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps




Procurement of Weapons and
Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army




Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
Other Procurement, Navy
Procurement, Marine Corps
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force
Missile Procurement, Air Force
























DoD COMPONENT BUDGET ACCOUNTS
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
Research, Development, Test, and RDTE,A
Evaluation, Army
Research, Development, Test, and RDTE,N
Evaluation, Navy
Research, Development, Test, and RDTE,AF
Evaluation, Air Force
This data represents budgets that have been reviewed and
approved up to and including the Office of Management and Budget.
All budget request amounts have been adjusted to include any
amendments to the budget request submitted to Congress before
enactment of the DoD Appropriations bill.^ The number of times the
President's budget request was amended per fiscal year is provided,
by account, in Table 3. These adjustments introduce some measure-
ment error and a slight model formulation error. The budget
request amendments are forwarded to Congress in varying amounts and
at various times; a negligible measurement error is incurred as
this study only deflates the total amount requested, as amended,
once for each year. A model formulation error is introduced in
that it is unclear whether amendments to the budget request reflect
legitimate program reappraisals or an increasing recognition of
Congressional sentiment. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to
^A statement of all amendments to or revisions in the budget authority
requested with respect to the fiscal year in progress, made before the date of
transmission of the upcoming budget, is included in each Budget of the United
States Government , Appendix.
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determine the influence of budget request revisions on the model,
and this error will initially be assumed minimal.
TABLE 3


























79 80 82 83 84 85 86 87
Supplemental budget requests are excluded for simplicity. Many
Supplementals are for non-controversial emergent requirements such
as repair of typhoon damage or ship collisions, and usually receive
a favorable response from Congress; inclusion of this data would
distort the Congressional response to DoD assertiveness
.
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Actual Congressional appropriations for the previous fiscal year
are provided in the U.S. Budget Appendix; these numbers were cross
checked against the applicable Public Laws. Appendix A lists these
DoD Appropriations Acts and other pertinent legislation for the
convenience of the reader/
I have chosen the years 1977 - 1988 because these years are
post-conscription (ended in 1973) and post-Vietnam; Fiscal Year
1977 is the first year after the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act for which a full budget was submitted and
the first year for which a Current Services Estimate was required.
It also marks a new era where the Appropriations Committees
gradually relinquished their role as budget savers to the Budget
Committees and Congress as a whole. Use of these years facilitates
annual comparison of budget accounts: five new Army procurement
accounts were created in 1972 and two new Navy procurement accounts
were created in 1974 (see Table 1) . Since 1977 is the first fiscal
year to begin on 1 October, we also avoid the problem of
annualizing the budget increment for the transition quarter 1976.
Yet another consideration is that time periods of obligation were
re-established in FY 1971; in the cold war era prior to the DoD
Appropriations Act of 1971, there was no time limit for obligating
appropriated funds
.
^For a listing of all appropriations measures (regular, supplemental, and
continuing resolution) for FYs 1981-1988, see The Federal Budget for 1989,
Hearing before the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives,
100th Congress, Second Session, Appendix M.
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The data is analyzed in nominal and real dollar increments to
avert the possibility that linear incremental results might merely
reflect rising prices. On the other hand, only analyzing the data
in constant dollars may hide any fiscal illusion phenomena
operative on Congressional decision making. Appendix B provides
the deflators used for this study. Note the accompanying graph
showing the divergence of the Military Personnel and Operation and
Maintenance deflators from the Gross National Product deflator.
The complete budgetary data set is provided in Appendices C and D.
B. MEASURES AND CRITERION'
Linear regression analysis is a technique used to estimate the
value of one quantitative variable by considering its relationship
with one or more other quantitative variables. A description or
study of the nature of the relationship between variables is called
regression analysis, while an investigation of the relative
strength of such a relationship is termed correlation analysis.
The simple linear regression model is a mathematical way of
stating the statistical relationship between two variables. The
two principal elements of this statistical relationship are: (1)
the tendency of the dependent random variable Y (in this study, the
percentage increment appropriated) to vary in a systematic way with
the independent variable x (the percentage increment requested)
,
and (2) the scattering of points about the "curve" that represents
the relationship between x and Y. This scattering of points can be
^I am indebted to Pfaffenberger (1987) and Giordano (1985) from which
portions have been taken directly or adopted from.
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the relationship between x and Y. This scattering of points can be
represented on a graph and is called a scatterplot. The systematic
way in which the random variable Y varies as a function of x is
identified as a straight line, the regression line of Y on x.
Our values of x, being historical data and reflecting the real
world, have the disadvantage of also reflecting the influence of
other variables as discussed in Section II-C (Modeling) that are
either uncontrollable or not tractable.
The formal statement of the simple linear regression model is
given below.
Y = a + bx. + e
where
:
Y = dependent random variable.
a,b = parameters in the regression model.
X = level of the independent variable,
e = random error term.
The two parameters in the simple linear regression model, a and
b, are called the regression coefficients, and are estimated from
the historical data, using statistical techniques. The coefficient
a is called the Y-intercept; it is the value of Y (according to the
regression line) when x = 0. The coefficient b is the slope of the
regression line; its numerical value gives the change in the
dependent random variaLble Y (either positive or negative) when
there is a one-unit increase in the value of the independent
variable, x.
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One criterion used to find the best-fitting line through the
scatter of points is called least squares. The specific values of
a and b that minimize the sum of the squared differences of each
observed y from its expected value are the regression coefficient
estimates. Least squares causes the sum of the residuals to be
zero and the sum of the squared differences to be minimized.
PlanPerfect 3.0^ was used for the regression analysis in this
thesis
.
There are various ways to measure budget assertiveness and
budget success. The measure chosen for assertiveness in this study
is the percentage increment over the base:
Budget Year Budget Request (1)
Current Year Current Services Estimate
The measure of effectiveness chosen for success is the percentage
increment over that same base:
Congressional Appropriation (2)
Current Year Current Services Estimate
Both of these measures measure the percentage increase (decrease)
over a common base, the Current Services Estimate or the "previous
year". For clarification, the assertiveness measure for FY 78 is:
FY 7 8 Request
FY 77 Current Services Estimate
and the success measure for FY 78 is:
FY 78 Appropriation
FY 77 Current Services Estimate
^PlanPerfect 3.0 is spreadsheet software from WordPerfect Corporation,
1555 North Technology Way, Orem, Utah 84057.
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The Current Services Estimate is used as the baseline because
that is the purpose for which the estimate was designed, as
discussed in Section II. Since the Current Services Estimate
reflects inflation adjusted program levels, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
sequestrations, and existing authorizing legislation, it can
reasonably be considered to reflect current Congressional and
Presidential policy.
The use of percentage increments instead of actual increments
permit a comparative analysis across accounts.
The criterion for measuring the relationship of budget
assertiveness [equation (2)] with budget success [equation (1) ]
will be the sample coefficient of determination r^. R^ measures the
strength of a linear relationship between two variables. It is
deemed a good criterion because the scatterplots show that a linear
relationship may be safely assumed for the range represented by the
collected data.
The percentage of the budget request that is appropriated may
also be measured and is represented by:
Congressional Appropriation e.g., FY 78 Appropriation
Budget Year Budget Request FY 78 Budget Request
Although this reflects the degree to which Congress agrees with the
budget request, it is not a good measure of effectiveness in that
it does not capture the growth in the agency's base. This measure
is calculated and presented with the calculations for equation (1)




IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The increments requested and appropriated with respect to the
Current Services Estimates baseline are calculated in percentage
terms, and are provided in Appendices C and D. The scatterplots
for all the budget accounts suggest the reasonableness of fitting a
linear model to the data. Plots of the estimated residuals against
the independent variable show no autocorrelation (Ostrom 1978,
p. 12) . Graphs comparing the measures for all budget accounts are
shown in Appendix E.
Unless otherwise specified, discussion of all results is based
on the data after adjusting for inflation. A t-ratio test was
applied to all regression results showing the x coefficient to be
significant at the 90% probability level for all accounts, except
RDT&E, Army, and significant for all accounts at the 80%
probability level.
Tables 4 and 5 show the budget accounts ranked by the
coefficient of determination ir
.
This shows the order of the
accounts in which assert iveness best explains the percentage
increment appropriated, when using nominal dollars and constant
dollars respectively. Table 6 shows the budget accounts in Table 5
(constant dollars) rearranged and ranked within each appropriation
for the convenience of the reader.
There is no correlation between the number of times the
President's Budget is amended (see Table 3) and the r^s in Table 5
(the calculated r' for this relationship was 0.00).
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TABLE 4
RANKING OF BUDGET ACCOUNTS BY if
(NOMINAL DOLLARS)
Procurement, Marine Corps 0.9766
Other Procurement, Air Force 0.9613
Military Personnel, Army 0.9612
Other Procurement, Army 0.9508
Military Personnel, Marine Corps 0.9487
Military Personnel, Air Force 0.9486
Military Personnel, Navy 0.9318
Operation and Maintenance, Army 0.9246
Aircraft Procurement, Army 0.9035
Operation and Maintenance, Navy 0.8947
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps 0.8933
Procurement of Weapons and 0.8780
Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army
Other Procurement, Navy 0.8742
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force 0.8579
Operation and Maintenance, Air Force 0.8377
Procurement of Ammunition, Army 0.824 9
Missile Procurement, Army 0.804 9
Research, Development, Test, and 0.7608
Evaluation, Navy
Research, Development, Test, and 0.7333
Evaluation, Air Force
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy 0.7150
Missile Procurement, Air Force 0.6741
Aircraft Procurement, Navy 0.6020
Weapons Procurement, Navy 0.37 68




RANKING OF BUDGET ACCOUNTS BY R^
(CONSTANT DOLLARS)
Procurement, Marine Corps 0.9771
Military Personnel, Army 0.9619
Other Procurement, Air Force 0.9579
Military Personnel, Marine Corps 0.9530
Military Personnel, Air Force 0.9516
Other Procurement, Army 0.9416
Military Personnel, Navy 0.9400
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps 0.9101
Operation and Maintenance, Army 0.9007
Aircraft Procurement, Army 0.9004
Other Procurement, Navy 0.888 5
Procurement of Weapons and 0.8562
Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force 0.8455
Research, Development, Test, and 0.8264
Evaluation, Navy
Procurement of Ammunition, Army 0.8220
Operation and Maintenance, Navy 0.8101
Missile Procurement, Army 0.7788
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy 0.7100
Operation and Maintenance, Air Force 0.7062
Research, Development, Test, and 0.6872
Evaluation, Air Force
Missile Procurement, Air Force 0.6643
Aircraft Procurement, Navy 0.5625
Weapons Procurement, Navy 0.474 9




RANKING OF BUDGET ACCOUNTS BY J^ BY APPROPRIATION
(CONSTANT DOLLARS)
MILITARY PERSONNEL
Military Personnel, Army 0.9619
Military Personnel, Marine Corps 0.9530
Military Personnel, Air Force 0.9516
Military Personnel, Navy 0.9400
OPERA rJON AND MAINTENANCE
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps 0.9101
Operation and Maintenance, Army 0.9007
Operation and Maintenance, Navy 0.8101
Operation and Maintenance, Air Force 0.7062
PROCUREMENT
Procurement, Marine Corps 0.9771
Other Procurement, Air Force 0.9579
Other Procurement, Army 0.9416
Aircraft Procurement, Army 0.9004
Other Procurement, Navy 0.8885
Procurement :>f Weapons and 0.8562
Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force 0.8455
Procurement of Ammunition, Army 0.8220
Missile Procurement, Army 0.7788
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy 0.7100
Missile Procurement, Air Force 0.6643
Aircraft Procurement, Navy 0.5625
Weapons Procurement, Navy 0.4749
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
Research, Development, Test, and 0.8264
Evaluation, Navy
Research, Development, Test, and 0.6872
Evaluation, Air Force
Research, Development, Test, and 0.2576
Evaluation, Army
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Figures 1 through 5 show graphical comparisons of budget
assertiveness and success across the services. The services seem
to be most synchronized with regard to Military Personnel
.
Of the four services, the Navy generally has the lowest r^s
.
This is an interesting finding in view of a related finding by
Lukenas (1974) that the Navy is the service most affected in terms
of the number of decisions and dollar amounts of reductions by the
House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee for the fiscal years
1970-1973. Lukenas also found the Marine Corps to be the least
affected. j
Procurement, Marine Corps performs the best with regard to
budget assertiveness. The other Marine Corps accounts are ranked
either first or second in the other appropriations. This suggests
corroboration of a general appreciation that the Marine Corps has
powerful friends in Congress.
The Military Personnel accounts seem to perform well and the
following reasons are suggested: (1) although Congress
theoretically has the incentive to cut manpower first because the
effects are not concentrated in any one district, it does not do
so, perhaps because of the voting power of the military, or the
recognition that cuts in this title create an exodus of trained
personnel; (2) Military Personnel has the highest first year
outlay rate (98%) and the highest reprogramming threshold
($10, 000, 000) --indicating perhaps a high level of confidence by the
Congress with DoD handling of this account; (3) a high proportion
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Figure 1 (b)
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Figure 4 (b)
Budget Assertiveness vs Budget Success: Other Procurement
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Figure 5 (b)
Budget Assertiveness vs Budget Success: RDT&E
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appropriated under a continuing authorization vice an annual
authorization; (4) the Military Personnel appropriation has the
lowest topline budget turbulence among the four major defense
appropriations^' and (5) the "riskier" or debatable portion of the
Military Personnel appropriation, pay raises, is enacted separately
in a supplemental appropriation.
The Civilian and Military Pay Raises account was created to
implement section 9094 of the DoD Appropriations Act, 1987, as
included in PL 99-500 and 99-591, section 101(c), and section 8139
of the DoD Appropriations Act, 1988. It involved the appropriation
and complete transfer to Military Personnel and Operation and
Maintenance of 1.911 billion and 875 million dollars in fiscal
years 1987 and 1988, respectively. These statutes provided:
. . . that such sums as may be necessary for authorized pay
raise costs in excess of [this] appropriation shall be accom-
modated within the levels appropriated in [this] Act.
Pay raises are typically an area for disagreement between the
President and the Congress. Non-DoD and DoD civilians all get the
same pay raise; coordinating a to-be-determined pay raise within
the 13 regular appropriation bills would delay the budgeting
process. Additionally, the amount of the military pay raise is
usually equal to that of the civilian pay raise. For the period
1977 - 1988, this was so except for FYs 1980, 1981, and 1985.
Hence, it is the convention that pay raises are not requested in
^Topline budget turbulence is defined as the annual variations about the
long-term mean level of funding actually appropriated by Congress. See




the regular budget submission, but are arranged through a
Supplemental. Mintz (1988, p. 8 9) found the average increase in
military basic pay to be much higher in election year budgets.
In the Procurement appropriation, we see that the Other
Procurement accounts do best while Missile and Weapons procurement
do the worst. The Procure/nent Marine Corps account does not suffer
this fate possibly because it has no strategic weapons programs and
hence avoids political controversy in this realm.
Generally, RDT&E had lower r^s . This may be due to the tendency
of recent DoD budgets to hold RDT&E to a ten percent relative share
of the overall DoD budget. The analysis implies RDT&E could have
been larger in several of the years studied had DoD requested
larger RDT&E increments.
The only notable shift in the rankings of r^ when analyzing
nominal vs constant dollars was a moderate drop in the ranking of
Operation and Maintenance, Navy, and Operation and Maintenance, Air
Force when calculated using constant dollars. Fuel is a
significant component of these two accounts and its price has
varied widely over the years studied. This suggests that O&M
accounts are penalized by the uncertainties of inflation budgeting,
e.g. for fuel.
Since there is no otherwise significant shifting of relative
rankings among the r^s when comparing nominal versus real
increments, we can perhaps deduce that a fiscal illusion does not
operate on Congressional decision making.
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A cross-sectional analysis was performed on the budgetary data.
The results are provided in Table 7. The significantly high r^ for
FY 1982 perhaps reflects President Reagan's mandate to increase
defense spending and Congressional acquiescence during the
honeymoon. The low jr for FY 1988 may reflect the effects of the 20
November 1987 budget summit between the President and Congressional
leaders that provided a compromise between defense and non-defense
spending. This budget agreement consequently led to a "top-down"
budget reformulation/execution for FY 88 and would mitigate any
assertiveness originally represented in the data. It will be
interesting to note if this represents a trend. The r^s may also be
correlated with public opinion or electoral cycles, and if so,




BUDGET ASSERTIVENESS VS BUDGET SUCCESS
RANGE RANGE
FY R' REQ'D APPRT'D
1978 .8008 0.429 0.382
1979 .9088 0.661 0.716
1980 .9192 0.814 0.880
1981 .7534 1.155 0.658
1982 .9933 2.436 2.404
1983 .7676 1.031 0.920
1984 .9250 0.823 0.849
1985 .7020 0.286 0.377
1986 .5732 0.378 0.251
1987 .8063 0.475 0.472
1988 .2878 0.385 0.886
Table 8 provides the model equations derived from the regression
analysis for the user to predict Congressional response to a budget
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account within the President's Budget. These equations should not
be used until the user has calculated the increment in real terms.
The model will provide the expected real increment Congress will
appropriate. Intervals for a 80% confidence level are also
provided, using a t-distribution with 9 degrees of freedom.
Table 9 provides the real increment (decrement) the model
predicts each budget account would receive if only a zero real
growth budget were requested. Statistically speaking, it is merely
a table of the regression equation constants, or the Y-intercepts
when the independent variable x = 0. This thesis does not mean to
imply that an overall zero real growth defense budget request would
result in a real cut. The table attempts to show that, in
isolation, each account would experience varying percentage cuts.
The size of the predicted decrements does show the relative
importance of requesting a budget increase in order to avoid a cut.
Note that it is predicted that all accounts would experience a real
cut except for Aircraft Procurement ^ Navy (APN) , and Shipbuilding
and Conversion, Navy (SCN) . These two accounts, along with Weapons
Procurement, Navy (WPN) have the largest regression constants
within the Procurement title. This could suggest the relatively
strong influence of naval weapons systems contractors on Congress
viz a viz other defense contractors or the incessant will of
Secretary John Lehman.
Table 10 shows the results of a multiple regression using both
the base and the increment requested, in real dollar amounts, as
independent variables. The model is as follows:
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Y = a + b x^ + CX2
where x^ = the base or current services estimate
X; = the amount of the increment requested
This regression analysis permits us to analyze the extent to which
the "base" is protected in each of the various accounts, and what
percentage of the increment requested is appropriated, by observing
the values of the coefficients. For the base to be inviolate, we
would expect the x^ coefficient to approach one (1.000) . (Wanat
1974)
The top ranking of the three Marine Corps accounts again
corroborates the friendship and respect experienced between the
Marine Corps and the Congress. The Procurement , Marine Corps
account takes top ranking perhaps because controversial advanced
technology hardware is introduced later into the Corps than it is
for the other services . The strong standing of the Marine Corps
baseline may also reflect Congressional sentiment that there is
less fat in these accounts.*
Again, we see the base for missile procurement accounts to be
more vulnerable than other accounts, perhaps illustrating the
political risk inherent in strategic weapons programs.
The tendency for the higher coefficients of the increment
variable to be in the operation and support accounts (O&M,
Ammunition, and Personnel) perhaps illustrates the "get it while
you can" philosophy.












-0.0124 + 0.9864 X
-0.0120 + 0.9194 X
-0.0096 + 0.9600 X












Y = -0.0419 + 0. 9948 X
y = -0.0456 + 1.1054 X
Y = -0.0154 + 0. 9441 X






APA Y = -0..0175 + 0,.9098 X [0,.77,1,.05]
MPrA Y = -0,,0460 + 0,.8217 X [0,.62,1,.03]
PWA Y = -0,.0770 + 1..0276 X [0,.83,1,.22]
PAA Y = -0..0647 + 1,.1403 X [0,.90,1,.38]
OPA Y = -0..1093 + 1,.0925 X [0,.97,1,.22]
APN Y = 0,.0014 + 0..7969 X [0..47,1,.12]
WPN Y = -0,.0077 + 0,.7859 X [0,.40,1,.17]
SON Y = 0,.0159 + 0..8578 X [0..61,1,.11]
OPN Y = -0,.0502 + 0,.7681 X [0,.64,0,.89]
PMC Y = -0..0800 + 0,.9541 X [0,.89,1,.02]
APAF y = -0,.0372 + 1..0382 X [0..83,1,.24]
MPrAF Y = -0,.1001 + 0,.9247 X [0,.62,1..23]
OPAF Y = -0,.0716 + 1..0745 X [0,.97,1..18]
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
RDTE,A Y = -0.0277 + 0.3464 X
RDTE,N Y = -0.0344 + 0.7747 X






PREDICTED CHANGE IN BUDGET ACCOUNTS




Military Personnel, Marine Corps






Operation and Maintenance, Army - 4.2%
Operation and Maintenance, Navy - 4.6%
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps - 1.5%




Procurement of Weapons and
Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army




Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
Other Procurement, Navy
Procurement, Marine Corps
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force
Missile Procurement, Air Force














RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation, Army
Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation, Navy



































This thesis suggests an agency should seek Congressional funds
aggressively but always with sufficient justification so as to
avoid damage to the agency's credibility with regard to budget
estimates (Wildavsky 1988) . The bounds of assertiveness are
suggested by Tables 11 and 12.
The degree to which observed data is distributed on a scale can
be measured by special statistics. The simplest measure of




























SUGGESTED UPPER BOUNDS FOR ASSERTXVENESS
MILITARY PERSONNEL
Military Personnel, Army 0%
Military Personnel, Navy 1%
Military Personnel, Marine Corps 1%
Military Personnel, Air Force 0%
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
Operation and Maintenance, Army 9%
Operation and Maintenance, Navy 8%
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps 9%
Operation and Maintenance, Air Force 12%
PROCUREMENT
Aircraft Procurement, Army 34%
Missile Procurement, Army 30%
Procurement of Weapons and 24%
Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army
Procurement of Ammunition, Army 35%
Other Procurement, Army 24%
Aircraft Procurement, Navy 6%
Weapons Procurement, Navy 20%
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy 5%
Other Procurement, Navy 2 9%
Procurement, Marine Corps 31%
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force 30%
Missile Procurement, Air Force 30%
Other Procurement, Air Force 30%
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
Research, Development, Test, and 17%
Evaluation, Army
Research, Development, Test, and 14%
Evaluation, Navy




BUDGET ACCOUNTS RANKED BY INTERQUARTILE RANGES
IQR' BY IQR BY
% INCREMENT REQUESTED % INCREMENT APPRT'D
INTER- ASSOC INTER- ASSOC
QUARTILE APPRT'D QUARTILE REQ'D
RANGE RANGE RANGE RANGE
APA .452 .344 SCN .726 .367
PMC .429 .480 PMC .480 .429
SCN .367 .726 MPrAF .437 .321
APAF .329 .326 PAA .344 .385
OPAF .323 .280 APA .333 .474
MPrA .286 .396 APAF .281 .392
MPrAF .280 .477 OPAF .275 .326
PAA .272 .443 PWA .263 .323
PWA .263 .395 MPrA .239 .463
OPN .258 .247 RDTE,AF .209 .229
OPA .201 .114 APN .203 .239
RDTE,N .160 .228 OPN .202 .376
RDTE,AF .143 .218 RDTE,N .160 .200
OMN .128 .182 OMMC .144 .104
RDTE,A .128 .151 WPN .122 .148
OMAF .123 .159 OPA .114 .201
MPAF .107 .069 OMN .107 .133
OMA .103 .105 OMA .093 .104
MPN .102 .073 OMAF .090 .126
MPA .095 .066 RDTE,A .073 .196
WPN .093 .303 MPN .063 .141
APN .091 .378 MPA .062 .112
OMMC .091 .151 MPMC .060 .087
MPMC .087 .060 MPAF .058 .130
*The first column of numbers is the IQR for the increment
percentages requested for each account; the second column is
the range of increment percentages appropriated (the seven
observations but not the IQR) that is associated with the
increment percentages requested IQR.
"The first column of numbers is the IQR for the increment
percentages appropriated for each account; the second column is
the range of increment percentages requested (the seven
observations but not the IQR) that is associated with the
increment percentages appropriated IQR.
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between the largest and smallest observation. The interquartile
range (IQR) measures the dispersion between, not the extremes, but
the 25th and 75th percentile.' The larger the range, or
interquartile range, is for a data set, the more variable (spread
out) the set of measurements is. (Bohrnstedt 1988)
Tables 11 and 12 utilize the interquartile range so as to
eliminate the unusual budgeting consequences of, say, an ideologi-
cal change in administrations, or a large one-time increment of a
two-aircraft carrier acquisition. Use of interquartile ranges is
also implied for those analysts who, while accepting the "assert-
iveness" theory, are still more comfortable submitting "realistic"
budgets, thereby combining the two theories. Table 11 is con-
structed by taking the requested increment associated with the
upper bound of the interquartile range (the 75th percentile) of
increments appropriated. In other words, using the interquartile
range, the highest appropriation increment was attained when this
increment (real) was requested, for the Fiscal Years 1978 - 1988.
Table 12 shows the degree to which requested increments and
appropriated increments have varied.
Finally, Table 13 shows both measures of success, averaged for
the fiscal years studied: 1) the percentage of the account's budget
request appropriated, and 2) the percentage real increment
appropriated (or annual growth) . Similar to Fenno's finding, we
found no correlation (r^ = .111) between the two measures. If we
use the average absolute increment appropriated, we also see no
See Glossary for an expanded explanation,
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correlation (r^ = .022) . In contrast, the correlation between the
average percentage increment requested with the average percentage
increment appropriated is high (iT = .821) . The r' using average
cQDSolute increment percentages requested and appropriated is .890.
A budget analyst might want to use both measures to capture
different dimensions of DoD budgeting.
We note that the three Marine Corps accounts each lead their
appropriations title with regard to average annual budget growth









MPA 98.8% MPA - 0.6%
MPN 98.8% MPN 0.2%
MPMC 99.1% MPMC 0.2%
MPAF 98.7% MPAF - 0.7%
OMA 96.0% OMA 1.1%
OMN 96.2% OMN 1.6%
OMMC 98.3% OMMC 3.8%
OMAF 95.5% OMAF 1.3%
APA 97.7% APA 11.5%
MPrA 93.8% MPrA 10.3%
PWA 93.3% PWA 5.3%
PAA 95.0% PAA 4.8%
OPA 91.9% OPA 9.3%
APN 99.0% APN 6.4%
WPN 97.9% WPN 5.4%
SCN 100.6% SCN 10.7%
OPN 94.0% OPN 1.0%
PMC 93.0% PMC 19.0%
APAF 96.5% APAF 3.6%
MPrAF 90.4% MPrAF 10.7%
OPT^ 94.5% OPAF 9.4%
RDTE,A 91.4% RDTE,A 0.9%
RDTE,N 95.3% RDTE,N 3.0%
RDTE,AF 92.6% RDTE,AF 7.1%
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis shows a significant degree of correlation between
budget assertiveness and budget success for most all the accounts
analyzed. The Marine Corps has a special propensity for achieving
budget success.
Generally, the "he who asks for more, gets more" rule applies.
Separate models--all linear--have been presented for the reader to
predict future near term Congressional appropriations.
This thesis suggests that Operation and Maintenance accounts are
marked by cost uncertainties or risks. Similarly, procurement of
strategic weapons is marked by political risks, and RDT&E is marked
by technological risk.
The reader should be aware of the following pitfalls when
adopting this thesis for his personal budget strategy:
(1) The model used in this thesis, budget success = f (budget
assertiveness) , is a simple one, and was applied to each account
individually. However, the individual budget accounts are not
independent of each other. Intense assertiveness in one account or
in one service may have a debilitating effect on other accounts or
services
.
(2) The data comprises specific Administration budgeting (Ford,
Carter, and Reagan) and specific Congress legislating (the 95th
through 100th) and is not necessarily predictive for a different
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President and/or a different Congress. Specifically, the following




Chairman, Senate Appropriations Committee
Chairman, Senate Budget Committee
Chairman, House Budget Committee
Chairman, Defense Subcommittee, House Appropriations
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Director, Congressional Budget Office
(3) The seeming comity of Congress with DoD assertiveness may be
spurious and merely reflect a common recognition of the need to
match defense spending with an increased citizen preference or an
increased threat
.
Comptrollers and agency heads should not be concerned with
presenting what some may perceive as unreasonable budget requests.
Assertive budget requests, properly justified, provide budget
reviewers a better means by which to judge the value of one
program's increment versus another. The struggle for limited
defense funds must be intensified, not mitigated, to ensure funding




RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
It would be worth investigating further the reasons for the
apparent budget success experienced by the Marine Corps as delin-
eated in this study, with a view towards applying those findings
throughout the Department of Defense. One could also study the
budgetary success regarding Marine Corps aircraft, amphibious
assault ships, and other weapons systems procured for the Marine
Corps by other services.
Since a significant proportion of funding changes to the
President's Budget are currently initiated in the Authorizations
Committee, one could study the implications for defense budgeting
from a merger of the Authorization and Appropriations committees;
or with the Budget Committee becoming a subcommittee within the
Appropriations Committee. One could also explore the degree to
which the convention that Appropriations bills originate in the
House is being disregarded.
Also meriting further investigation would be a refinement of the
model presented in this thesis to include some of the variables
listed in Section II-C. For example, among major weapon systems
programs, the researcher could investigate to what degree the
reputation and expertise level of the program manager influences
the appropriation of funds. In the context of end-of-year spending
criticism, it would be interesting to explore the correlation






























PL 94--419 DoD Appropriations Act,r 1977
PL 95--111 DoD Appropriations Act,, 1978
PL 95--457 DoD Appropriations Act,, 1979
PL 96--154 DoD Appropriations Act, 1980
PL 96--527 DoD Appropriations Act 1981
PL 97--114 DoD Appropriations Act 1982
PL 97--377 DoD Appropriations Act, 1983
PL 98--212 DoD Appropriations Act 1984
PL 98--473 DoD Appropriations Act 1985
PL 99--190 DoD Appropriations Act , 1986
PL 99--500 DoD Appropriations Act , 1987
PL 99--591 DoD Appropriations Act , 1987
PL 100--202 DoD Appropriations Act , 1988
PL 94--361 DoD Authorization Act, 1977
PL 95-- 79 DoD Authorization Act, 1978
PL 95--485 DoD Authorization Act, 1979
PL 96--107 DoD Authorization Act, 1980
PL 96--342 DoD Authorization Act, 1981
PL 97-- 86 DoD Authorization Act, 1982
PL 97--252 DoD Authorization Act, 1983
PL 98-- 94 DoD Authorization Act, 1984
PL 98--525 DoD Authorization Act, 1985
PL 99--145 DoD Authorization Act, 1986
PL 99--661 DoD Authorization Act, 1987
PL 100--180 DoD Authorization Act, 1988
and
PL 93-344 Congressional Budget and Impound-
ment Control Act of 1974
12 Dec 85
30 Sep 87
PL 99-177 Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985
(Gramm-Rudman-Hollings)
PL 100-119 Balanced Budget and Emergency




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFLATORS - TOA
FY MILPERS & M PRCRMT RDT&E GNP
77 0.4847 0.5291 0.5048 0.5269 0.5283
78 0.5178 0.5706 0.5551 0.5701 0.5642
79 0.5498 0.6191 0.6136 0.6238 0.6139
80 0.5912 0.7179 0.6775 0.6877 0.6679
81 0.6803 0.7884 0.7364 0.7470 0.7347
82 0.7762 0.8284 0.7841 0.7889 0.7883
83 0.8033 0.8447 0.8209 0.8182 0.8215
84 0.8413 0.8570 0.8484 0.8481 0.8527
85 0.9003 0.8769 0.8745 0.8741 0.8800
86 0.9269 0.8795 0.9030 0.8977 0.9046
87 0.9397 0.9065 0.9350 0.9276 0.9290
88 0.9695 0.9651 0.9684 0.9648 0.9634
89 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
90 1.0442 1.0339 1.0293 1.0338 1.0360
91 1.0892 1.0669 1.0558 1.0649 1.0702
Source: National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1988/1989,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
,
April 1988.
DoD DEFLATORS -- TOA
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BUDGETARY DATA SET (NOMINAL DOLLARS)
MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMY
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 8,870,000 8,682,166 8,564,011
78 9,144,600 8,790,943 8,741,800 99.44% -0.009 -0.014
79 9,594,700 9,180,000 9,154,325 99.72% 0.004 0.001
80 10,376,019 9,848,900 9,668,819 98.17% 0.026 0.008
81 12,148,100 10,871,868 11,060,468 101.73% 0.048 0.066
82 12,447,827 12,631,700 12,447,827 98.54% 0.040 0.025
83 14,604,848 14,401,100 14,454,848 100.37% 0.157 0.161
84 15,241,733 15,237,800 15,048,533 98.76% 0.043 0.030
85 21,580,334 21,172,900 21,020,344 99.28% 0.389 0.379
86 22,491,137 22,712,000 21,078,169 92.81% 0.052 -0.023
87 22,976,853 22,655,000 22,353,990 98.67% 0.007 -0.006
88 23,701,252 23,681,200 23,427,732 98.93% 0.031 0.020
1 Maximum: 1.017 0.389 0.379
Minimiom: 0.928 -0.009 -0.023
Average: 0.988 0.072 0.059










Std Err of Y Est 0.0245
R Squared 0.9612
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
1.0144






% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 6,157, 000 6,055,667 6,002,268
78 6,529, 100 6,182,312 6,169,662 99.80% 0.004 0.002
79 6,768, 300 6,463,000 6,461, 600 99.98% -0.010 -0.010
80 7,271, 093 6,914,500 6,857,256 99.17% 0.022 0.013
81 8,612, 706 7,533,294 7,857,423 104.30% 0.036 0.081
82 9,117, 956 9,340,090 9,117,956 97.62% 0.084 0.059
83 10, 661, 208 10,578,900 10,537,408 99.61% 0.160 0.156
84 11,450, 908 11,309,800 11,171,278 98.78% 0.061 0.048
85 16,060, 907 15,897,500 15,660,246 98.51% 0.388 0.368
86 16, 989, 409 17,221,400 15,917,144 92.43% 0.072 -0.009
87 17,550, 397 17,459,500 17,104,850 97.97% 0.028 0.007
88 18,176, 297 18,259,100 17,971,297 98.42% 0.040 0.024
Maximum: 1.043 0.388 0.368














Std Err of Y Est 0.0305
R Squared 0.9318
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.9565
Std Err of Coef.
0.0862
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MILITARY PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 1,909,500 1,883,900 1,854,334
78 2,020,364 1,923,000 1,918,400 99.76% 0.007 0.005
79 2,112,400 2,016,500 2,014,975 99.92% -0.002 -0.003
80 2,218,281 2,135,000 2,089,457 97.87% 0.011 -0.011
81 2,558,500 2,260,051 2,350,086 103.98% 0.019 0.059
82 2,766,966 2,807,870 2,766,966 98.54% 0.097 0.081
83 3,330,977 3,276,100 3,293,277 100.52% 0.184 0.190
84 3,519,569 3,467,300 3,433,859 99.04% 0.041 0.031
85 4, 934,346 4,845,900 4,803,366 99.12% 0.377 0.365
86 5,196,279 5,217,400 4,870,016 93.34% 0.057 -0.013
87 5,407,053 5,333,400 5,266,053 98.74% 0.026 0.013




Minimum: 0.933 -0.002 -0.013
Average 0.991 0.077 0.066










Std Err of Y Est 0.0275
R Squared 0.9487
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
0.9925
Std Err of Coef,
0.0770
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MILITARY PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 7, 363,600 7,169,567 7,136,706
78 7, 596,700 7,240,200 7,199,900 99.44% -0.017 -0.022
79 7, 891,200 7,576,000 7,525,001 99.33% -0.003 -0.009
80 8, 391,115 7,966,900 7,863,817 98.71% 0.010 -0.003
81 9, 866,871 8,728,209 8,976,309 102.84% 0.040 0.070
82 10, 305,414 10,440,820 10,305,414 98.70% 0.058 0.044
83 12, 195,950 12,031,400 12,099,850 100.57% 0.167 0.174
84 12, 905,263 12,779,000 12, 577,203 98.42% 0.048 0.031
85 18, 020,153 17,799,900 17,572,005 98.72% 0.379 0.362
86 19, 006,575 19,187,900 17,744,770 92.48% 0.065 -0.015
87 19, 457,758 19,290,500 18,940,731 98.19% 0.015 -0.003
88 19, 815,960 19,908,200 19,583,118 98.37% 0.023 0.006
Maximum: 1.028 0.379 0.362














Std Err of Y Est 0.0276
R Squared 0.9486
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.9924
Std Err of Coef,
0.0770
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OPERATION & MA.INTEN2kNCE, ARMY
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 8,112,333 8,060,400 7,898,285
78 8,509,674 8,490,869 8,139,413 95.86% 0.047 0.003
79 9,294,167 9,233,400 9,115,000 98.72% 0.085 0.071
80 10,539,618 10,265,500 9,915,368 96.59% 0.105 0.067
81 12,478,184 12,505,808 12,307,784 98.42% 0.187 0.168
82 14,948,197 15,207,500 15,037,897 98.88% 0.219 0.205
83 15,982,939 16,816,100 15,847,425 94.24% 0.125 0.060
84 17,244,396 17,655,800 17,054,846 96.60% 0.105 0.067
85 18,603,698 19,486,518 18,411,078 94.48% 0.130 0.068
86 20,210,669 20,190,630 18,975,507 93.98% 0.085 0.020
87 20,440,016 21,341,870 20,022,399 93.82% 0.056 -0.009




Minimum: 0.938 0.047 -0.009
Average 0.962 0.114 0.072










Std Err of Y Est 0.0191
R Squared 0.9246
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
1.2153




OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 9, 697,116 9,660,800 9,565,164
78 11,036,563 10,891,862 10,743,263 98.64% 0.123 0.108
79 11,824,095 11,843,000 11,691,000 98.72% 0.073 0.059
80 13,591,595 13,561,846 13,272,245 97.86% 0.147 0.122
81 17,246,094 16,896,652 16,870,894 99.85% 0.243 0.241
82 19,359,489 19, 611,170 19,385,889 98.85% 0.137 0.124
83 21,093,657 22,142,000 21,079,712 95.20% 0.144 0.089
84 22,176,128 22,601,600 21,943,818 97.09% 0.071 0.040
85 25,334,741 26,248,426 25,116,241 95.69% 0.184 0.133
86 25,072,519 25,797,700 24,477,071 94.88% 0.018 -0.034
87 23,303,965 25,688,500 22,939,674 89.30% 0.025 -0.085
88 24,708, 375 25,652,830 23,601,462 92.00% 0.101 0.013
Maximum: 0.998 0.243 0.241
Minimum: 0.893 0.018 -0.085
Average: 0.962 0.115 0.074










Std Err of Y Est 0.0305
R Squared 0.8947
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
1.2596
Std Err of Coef,
0.1440
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OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 600,409 580,400 569,288 98.09%
78 635,028 636,200 615,628 96.77% 0.060 0.025
79 735,800 744,100 733,000 98.51% 0.172 0.154
80 818,646 764,500 802,046 104.91% 0.039 0.090
81 1,030,600 1,035,642 1,003,900 96.94% 0.265 0.226
82 1, 178,740 1,176,940 1,185,540 100.73% 0.142 0.150
83 1,469, 647 1,481,800 1,481,671 99.99% 0.257 0.257
84 1, 548,620 1,554,900 1,524,600 98.05% 0.058 0.037
85 1,650,894 1,683,069 1,640,294 97.46% 0.087 0.059
86 1,666,450 1,667,400 1,612,050 96.68% 0.010 -0.024
87 1,809,640 1,864,100 1,793,750 96.23% 0.119 0.076
88 1,795,288 1, 918,367 1,819,188 94.83% 0.060 0.005
Maximum: 1.049 0.265 0.257














Std Err of Y Est 0.0312
R Squared 0.8933
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.9974
Std Err of Coef,
0.1149
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OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 8,249,835 8,224,700 8,107,077
78 8,719,879 8,586,114 8,335,279 97.08% 0.041 0.010
79 9,347,684 9,415,200 9,243,000 98.17% 0.080 0.060
80 10,670,250 10,753,600 10,459,750 97.27% 0.150 0.119
81 13,789,546 13,167,626 13,611,046 103.37% 0.234 0.276
82 16,020,619 16,696,076 16,079,719 96.31% 0.211 0.166
83 17,029,403 17,944,700 16,915,766 94.27% 0.120 0.056
84 17, 686,095 18,250, 100 17, 573,895 96.29% 0.072 0.032
85 19,213,465 20,234,500 19,093,265 94.36% 0.144 0.080
86 20,176,538 20,924,400 19,536,813 93.37% 0.089 0.017
87 18,935,773 21,214,500 18,636,816 87.85% 0.051 -0.076




Minimtim: 0.878 0.041 -0.076
Average: 0.955 0.120 0.071











Std Err of Y Est 0.0390
R Squared 0.8377
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
1.3530





% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 546,100 555,500 541, 900
78 659,700 665,300 657,100 98.77% 0.218 0.203
79 949,709 1,017,800 949,709 93.31% 0.543 0.440
80 951,037 946,400 961,837 101.63% -0.003 0.013
81 1,076,400 933,400 1,076,400 115.32% -0.019 0.132
82 1,936,100 1,897,300 1,911,100 100.73% 0.763 0.775
83 2,487,072 2,745,914 2,506,572 91.28% 0.418 0.295
84 3,273,248 3,441,100 3,214,048 93.40% 0.384 0.292
85 3,764,267 4,008,300 3,940,900 98.32% 0.225 0.204
86 3,540,571 3,840, 646 3,524,200 91.76% 0.020 -0.064
87 2,819,186 3,267,017 2,762,750 84.56% -0.077 -0.220




Minimum: 0.846 -0.087 -0.220
Average 0.977 0.217 0.185










Std Err of Y Est 0.0894
R Squared 0.9035
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.9203






% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 487,000 552,400 497,400
78 536,883 451,600 536,883 118.88% -0.073 0.102
79 736,900 773,200 736,900 95.31% 0.440 0.373
80 1,162,500 1,250,500 1,140,800 91.23% 0.697 0.548
81 1,519,800 1,514,400 1,519,800 100.36% 0.303 0.307
82 2,155,200 2,210,200 2,131,200 96.43% 0.454 0.402
83 2,266,600 2,846,600 2,287,000 80.34% 0.321 0.061
84 2,824,100 3,060,500 2,827,300 92.38% 0.350 0.247
85 3,165, 915 3,442,400 3,167,000 92.00% 0.219 0.121
86 3,004,845 3,336,291 2,765,932 82.90% 0.054 -0.126
87 2,045,937 2,510,450 2,206,800 87.90% -0.165 -0.266
88 2,278,025 2,470,996 2,332,237 94.38% 0.208 0.140
Maximum: 1.189 0.697 0.548
Minimum: 0.803 -0.165 -0.266













Std Err of Y Est 0.1102
R Squared 0.8049
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
0.8578
Std Err of Coef.
0.1408
72
PROCUREMENT OF WEAPONS AND TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, ARMY
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 1,129,600 1,147,900 1,117,600
78 1,421,200 1,651,700 1,421,200 86.04% 0.462 0.258
79 1,511,100 1,636,600 1,511,100 92.33% 0.152 0.063
80 1,824,500 1,888,900 1,836,200 97.21% 0.250 0.215
81 2,582,200 2,519,000 2,582,200 102.51% 0.381 0.415
82 3,876,300 3,856,700 3,825,200 99.18% 0.494 0.481
83 4,698,546 5,024,485 4,750,146 94.54% 0.296 0.225
84 4,663,033 4,890,416 4,743,103 96.99% 0.041 0.009
85 5,001,165 5,092,700 4,548,100 89.31% 0.092 -0.025
86 4,498,153 5,658,926 4,684,800 82.79% 0.132 -0.063
87 3,588,138 4,289,240 3,804,300 88.69% -0.046 -0.154




Minimum: 0.828 -0.077 -0.154
Average 0.933 0.198 0.120










Std Err of Y Est 0.0784
R Squared 0.8780
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
1.0224
Std Err of Coef,
0.1271
73
PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, ARMY
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 909,700 910,800 902,900
78 1,265,000 1,348,900 1,236,800 91.69% 0.483 0.360
79 1,248,100 1,420,100 1,248,100 87.89% 0.123 -0.013
80 1,232,800 1,343,400 1,232,800 91.77% 0.076 -0.012
81 1,531,000 1,515,100 1,531,000 101.05% 0.229 0.242
82 2,302,500 2,282,500 2,381,900 104.35% 0.491 0.556
83 2,121,994 2,625,684 2,122,394 80.83% 0.140 -0.078
84 1,939,900 2,311,189 1, 980,100 85.67% 0.089 -0.067
85 2,621,848 2,494,000 2,646,300 106.11% 0.286 0.364
86 2,421,486 2,607,516 2,497,200 95.77% -0.005 -0.048
87 2,112,307 2,161,241 2,087,150 96.57% -0.107 -0.138
88 2,337,035 2,191,275 2,273,592 103.76% 0.037 0.076
Maximum: 1.061 0.491 0.556














Std Err of Y Est 0.1013
R Squared 0.8249
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
1.0971





% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 1,393,600 1,417, 900 1,366,600
78 1,418,025 1,503,400 1,406,025 93.52% 0.079 0.009
79 1,682,250 1,789,200 1,682,250 94.02% 0.262 0.186
80 1,454,810 1,694,200 1,482,410 87.50% 0.007 -0.119
81 2,223,658 2,321,833 2,223,658 95.77% 0.596 0.528
82 3,705,871 3,683,800 3,721,971 101.04% 0.657 0.674
83 4,108,304 4,625,791 4,123,404 89.14% 0.248 0.113
84 4,649,928 5,267,877 4,680,528 88.85% 0.282 0.139
85 5,035,470 6,022,400 5,122,450 85.06% 0.295 0.102
86 5,003,389 5,485,606 5,270,556 96.08% 0.089 0.047
87 4,812,747 5,707,693 5,118,752 89.68% 0.141 0.023
88 4,847,669 5,650,374 5,093,549 90.15% 0.174 0.058
Maximiam: 1.010 0.657 0.674














Std Err of Y Est 0.0548
R Squared 0.9508
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
1.1155
































































































































% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 2,045,200 2,239,700 2,022,200
78 2,234,600 2,359,400 2,234,600 94.71% 0.154 0.093
79 1,955,600 2,047,500 1,955,600 95.51% -0.084 -0.125
80 1,962,214 1,973,500 1,996,514 101.17% 0.009 0.021
81 2,738,132 2,253,500 2,766,029 122.74% 0.148 0.410
82 3,215,100 3,283,800 3,207,100 97.66% 0.199 0.171
83 3,435,100 3,901,600 3,561,700 91.29% 0.214 0.108
84 3,769,579 3,992,600 3,758,564 94.14% 0.162 0.094
85 4,430,247 4,650,860 4,336,611 93.24% 0.234 0.150
86 4,894,757 5,155,255 5,017,295 97.32% 0.164 0.133
87 5,085,089 5,762,743 5,186,847 90.01% 0.177 0.060
88 5,483,198 6,014, 969 5,967,019 99.20% 0.183 0.173
Maximum: 1.227 0.234 0.410














Std Err of Y Est 0.1070
R Squared 0.3768
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
0.8348
Std Err of Coef,
0.3579
77
SHIPBUILDING & CONVERSION, NAVY
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 6,195, 000 7,263,500 6,195,000
78 5,802, 500 5,931,200 5,802,500 97.83% -0.043 -0.063
79 3,759, 600 4,712,400 3,759,600 79.78% -0.188 -0.352
80 6,682, 350 6,173,800 6,648,050 107.68% 0.642 0.768
81 7,483, 600 6,179,200 7,483,600 121.11% -0.075 0.120
82 8,638, 900 8,475,300 8, 938, 900 105.47% 0.133 0.194
83 16,248, 100 18,648,300 16,287,900 87.34% 1.159 0.885
84 11,437, 000 12,585,800 11,302,500 89.80% -0.225 -0.304
85 11,281, 770 13,141, 900 11,736,000 89.30% 0.149 0.026
86 9,495, 668 11,209,588 10,598,700 94.55% -0.006 -0.061
87 9,885, 786 11,975,007 10,086,989 84.23% 0.261 0.062
88 14,861, 742 10,769,975 16,155,355 150.00% 0.089 0.634
Maximum: 1.500 1.159 0.885
Minimum: 0.798 -0.225 -0.352
Average: 1.006 0.172 0.174










Std Err of Y Est 0.2338
R Squared 0.7150
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9





% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 2,199,200 2,192,800 2,173,400
78 2,186,410 2,220,600 2,186,410 98.46% 0.010 -0.006
79 2,641,600 2,708,600 2,641,600 97.53% 0.239 0.208
80 2,624,756 2,694,500 2,624,756 97.41% 0.020 -0.006
81 3,037,657 3,201,891 3,037,657 94.87% 0.220 0.157
82 3,676,577 3,822,000 3,708,777 97.04% 0.258 0.221
83 3,653,275 3,969,356 3,727,075 93.90% 0.080 0.014
84 4,314,543 4,887,501 4,177,680 85.48% 0.338 0.144
85 5,663,184 5,953,900 5,290,614 88.86% 0.380 0.226
86 5,961,232 6,220,377 6,121,630 98.41% 0.098 0.081
87 6,461,087 6,664,038 5,912,071 88.72% 0.118 -0.008
88 5,090,533 5,227,057 4,872,461 93.22% -0.191 -0.246
Maximum: 0.985 0.380 0.226














Std Err of Y Est 0.0529
R Squared 0.8742
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.7996





% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 319,800 337,700 328,400
78 450,200 460,000 450,200 97.87% 0.438 0.408
79 356,000 371,900 356,000 95.72% -0.174 -0.209
80 283,785 284,200 283,785 99.85% -0.202 -0.203
81 486,813 618,621 486,813 78.69% 1.180 0.715
82 1,711,456 1,734,916 1,711,456 98.65% 2.564 2.516
83 1,977,383 2,300,700 2,008,083 87.28% 0.344 0.173
84 1,741,306 1,835,049 1,741,306 94.89% -0.072 -0.119
85 1,879,999 1,978,581 1,836,722 92.83% 0.136 0.055
86 1,674,965 1,743,844 1,660,766 95.24% -0.072 -0.117
87 1,563,556 1,604,819 1,465,215 91.30% -0.042 -0.125




Minimum: 0.787 -0.202 -0.209













Std Err of Y Est 0.1291
R Squared 0.9766
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.9517
Std Err of Coef,
0.0491
80
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE
(NOMINAL $ 000}
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 6,148,100 6,344,800 6,089,200
78 6,241,500 6,144,000 6,296,400 102.48% -0.001 0.024
79 6,885,207 6,897,700 6,893,307 99.94% 0.105 0.104
80 8,082,181 7,931,200 8,085,040 101.94% 0.152 0.174
81 9,674,143 8,654,143 9,674,143 111.79% 0.071 0.197
82 13,802,798 13,843,898 13,818,998 99.82% 0.431 0.428
83 17,595,300 17,834,800 17,828,500 99.96% 0.292 0.292
84 21,387,710 22,506,190 21,390,310 95.04% 0.279 0.216
85 24,823,163 28,676,500 26,188,266 91.32% 0.341 0.224
86 21,671,523 25,591,445 23,255,424 90.87% 0.031 -0.063
87 18,085,305 20,025,852 17,131,281 85.55% -0.076 -0.210




Minimum: 0.831 -0.138 -0.284
Average 0.965 0.135 0.100










Std Err of Y Est 0.0856
R Squared 0.8579
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
1.0998
Std Err of Coef,
0.1492
81
MISSILE PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 1, 864,000 1,916,400 1,861,000
78 1, 740,300 1,903,700 1,745,200 91.67% 0.021 -0.064
79 Ir 513,500 1,676,800 1,579,800 94.22% -0.036 -0.092
80 2, 182,985 2,303,600 2,175,385 94.43% 0.522 0.437
81 3, 140,917 3,077,584 3,140,917 102.06% 0.410 0.439
82 4, 573, 950 4,204, 646 4,559,550 108.44% 0.339 0.452
83 4, 958,700 6,795,900 4,956,100 72.93% 0.486 0.084
84 7, 811,838 8,059,130 7,802,838 96.82% 0.625 0.574
85 7, 651,268 9,820,600 8,409,245 85.63% 0.257 0.076
86 7, 416,495 10,085,288 8,312,442 82.42% 0.318 0.086
87 7, 940,083 8,436,889 7,446,718 88.26% 0.138 0.004
88 7, 675,491 9,355,658 7,290,771 77.93% 0.178 -0.082
Maximum: 1.084 0.625 0.574














Std Err of Y Est 0.1502
R Squared 0.6741
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9




OTHER PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 2,296,600 2,424,900 2,309,700
78 2,328,245 2,477,000 2,342,145 94.56% 0.079 0.020
79 2,393,650 2,516,100 2,399,250 95.36% 0.081 0.030
80 2,632,741 2,674,100 2,647,631 99.01% 0.117 0.106
81 2,999,372 3,257,876 2,999,372 92.07% 0.237 0.139
82 5,366,433 5,174,144 5,366,433 103.72% 0.725 0.789
83 5,540,940 5,836,200 5,568,740 95.42% 0.088 0.038
84 6,895,937 7,465,212 6,914,232 92.62% 0.347 0.248
85 8,366,940 9,561,500 8,861,697 92.68% 0.387 0.285
86 7,568,638 9,200,629 8,272,383 89.91% 0.100 -0.011
87 9,035,977 10,045,714 9,254,941 92.13% 0.327 0.223
88 8,294,529 8,687,445 8,010,827 92.21% -0.039 -0.113
Maximum: 1.037 0.725 0.789














Std Err of Y Est 0.0500
R Squared 0.9613
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
1.1033
Std Err of Coef,
0.0738
83
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, & EVALUATION, ARMY
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 2,305,117 2,386,197 2,280,816
78 2,418,327 2,522,100 2,417,882 95.87% 0.094 0.049
79 2,635,864 2,721,400 2,635,864 96.86% 0.125 0.090
80 2,845,231 2,927,000 2,855,331 97.55% 0.110 0.083
81 3,086,757 3,234,483 3,086,757 95.43% 0.137 0.085
82 3,609,535 3,768,500 3,609,535 95.78% 0.221 0.169
83 3,884,783 4,503,500 3,879,683 86.15% 0.248 0.075
84 4,259,375 4,711,200 4,199,125 89.13% 0.213 0.081
85 4,398,047 4,987,100 4,349,015 87.21% 0.171 0.021
86 4, 611,638 5,189,521 4,798,172 92.46% 0.180 0.091
87 4,707,161 5,465,494 4,556,076 83.36% 0.185 -0.012
88 4, 688, 304 5,450, 548 4, 687,513 86.00% 0.158 -0.004
Maximum: 0.976 0.248 0.169
Minimum: 0.834 0.094 -0.012
Average: 0.914 0.167 0.066










Std Err of Y Est 0.0528
R Squared 0.0416
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
0.2165
Std Err of Coef.
0.3462
84
{^SEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, & EVALUATION, NAVY
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 3,800, 395 4,055,200 3,722,792
78 4,021, 791 4,212,900 3,991,791 94.75% 0.109 0.050
79 4,483, 871 4,490,500 4,483,871 99.85% 0.117 0.115
80 4,566, 019 4,484,000 4,553,319 101.55% 0.000 0.015
81 4,895, 109 4,862,879 4,867,212 100.09% 0.065 0.066
82 5,807, 121 5,885,488 5,844,357 99.30% 0.202 0.194
83 6,086, 031 6,211,400 5,965,751 96.05% 0.070 0.027
84 7,571, 718 8,059,743 7,559,818 93.80% 0.324 0.242
85 9,199, 183 9,826,076 9,172,622 93.35% 0.298 0.211
86 10,004, 437 11,156,830 10,065,239 90.22% 0.213 0.094
87 9,342, 430 10,558,998 9,326,418 88.33% 0.055 -0.068
88 9,448, 106 10,448,112 9,493,546 90.86% 0.118 0.016
Maximum: 1.015 0.324 0.242















Std Err of Y Est 0.0492
R Squared 0.7608
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.8044
Std Err of Coef,
0.1504
85
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, & EVALUATION, AIR FORCE
(NOMINAL $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 3,806, 440 3, 924,600 3,749,530
78 3,952, 666 4,532,400 3,917,766 86.44% 0.191 0.029
79 4,211, 040 4,339,100 4, 131,040 95.20% 0.098 0.045
80 5,026, 032 5,060,100 5,023,173 99.27% 0.202 0.193
81 6,775, 811 7,033,393 6,774,011 96.31% 0.399 0.348
82 8,819, 310 8,823,400 8,569,610 97.12% 0.302 0.265
83 10,625, 561 11,273,500 10,650,661 94.48% 0.278 0.208
84 12,220, 706 12,781,197 12,227,706 95.67% 0.203 0.151
85 13,832, 461 14,401,955 13,424,147 93.21% 0.178 0.098
86 13,235, 595 15,454,165 13,718,208 88.77% 0.117 -0.008
87 15,241, 679 16,785,723 15,062,783 89.74% 0.268 0.138
88 15,195, 966 18,279,422 15,002,095 82.07% 0.199 -0.016
Maximum: 0.993 0.399 0.348














Std Err of Y Est 0.0632
R Squared 0.7333
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
1.1572




BUDGETARY DATA SET (CONSTANT FY 1989 DOLLARS)
MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMY
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 18,299,979 17,912,453 17,668,684
78 17,660,487 16,977,487 16,882,580 99.44% -0.072 -0.077
79 17,451,255 16,696,981 16,650,282 99.72% -0.055 -0.057
80 17,550,776 16,659,168 16,354,565 98.17% -0.045 -0.063
81 17,856,975 15,980,991 16,258,221 101.73% -0.089 -0.074
82 16,036,881 16,273,770 16,036,881 98.54% -0.089 -0.102
83 18,181,063 17, 927,424 17,994,333 100.37% 0.118 0.122
84 18,116,882 18,112,207 17,887,238 98.76% -0.004 -0.016
85 23,970,159 23,517,605 23,348,155 99.28% 0.298 0.289
86 24,264,901 24,503,183 22,740,500 92.81% 0.022 -0.051
87 24,451,264 24,108,758 23,788,432 98.67% -0.006 -0.020





Minimum: 0.928 -0.089 -0.102
Average 0.988 0.007 -0.006










Std Err of Y Est 0.0235
R Squared 0.9619
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom -.. 9
X Coef ficient (s)
0.9864




(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRI"N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 12,702,703 12, 493,639 12,383, 470
78 12,609,309 11, 939,575 11, 915, 145 99.80% -0.060 -0.062
79 12,310,477 11, 755,184 11,752, 637 99.98% -0.068 -0.068
80 12,298,872 11, 695,704 11,598, 877 99.17% -0.050 -0.058
81 12,660,159 11, 073,488 11,549, 938 104.30% -0.100 -0.061
82 11,746,916 12, 033,097 11,746, 916 97.62% -0.050 -0.072
83 13,271,764 13, 169,302 13,117, 650 99.61% 0.121 0.117
84 13,610,969 13, 443,243 13,278, 590 98.78% 0.013 0.001
85 17,839,506 17, 658,003 17,394, 475 98.51% 0.297 0.278
86 18,329,279 18, 579,566 17,172, 450 92.43% 0.041 -0.037
87 18,676,596 18, 579,866 18,202, 458 97.97% 0.014 -0.007




























Std Err c)f Y Est 0.0275
R Squared 0.9400
No. of Observations 11
Degrees c)f Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s]
0.9194
Std Err of Coef,
0.0774
88
MILITARY PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 3,939,550 3,886,734 3,825,736
78 3,901,823 3,713,789 3,704,905 99.76% -0.057 -0.060
79 3,842,124 3,667,697 3,664,924 99.92% -0.060 -0.061
80 3,752,167 3,611,299 3,534,264 97.87% -0.060 -0.080
81 3,760,841 3,322,139 3,454,485 103.98% -0.115 -0.079
82 3,564,759 3,617,457 3,564,759 98.54% -0.038 -0.052
83 4,146,616 4,078,302 4,099,685 100.52% 0.144 0.150
84 4,183,489 4,121,360 4,081,611 99.04% -0.006 -0.016
85 5,480,780 5,382,539 5,335,295 99.12% 0.287 0.275
86 5,606,084 5,628,870 5,254,090 93.34% 0.027 -0.041
87 5,754,020 5,675,641 5,603,973 98.74% 0.012 0.000




Minimum: 0.933 -0.115 -0.080
Average: 0.991 0.012 0.002










Std Err of Y Est 0.0254
R Squared 0.9530
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.9600
Std Err of Coef,
0.0711
89
MILITARY PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE (BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 15,192,078 14,791,762 14,723,965
78 14,671,109 13,982,619 13,904,789 99.44% -0.080 -0.085
79 14,352,856 13,779,556 13,686,797 99.33% -0.061 -0.067
80 14,193,361 13,475,812 13,301,450 98.71% -0.061 -0.073
81 14,503,706 12,829,941 13,194,633 102.84% -0.096 -0.070
82 13,276,751 13,451,198 13,276,751 98.70% -0.073 -0.085
83 15,182,310 14,977,468 15,062,679 100.57% 0.128 0.135
84 15,339,668 15,189,588 14, 949,724 98.42% 0.000 -0.015
85 20,015,720 19,771,076 19,517,944 98.72% 0.289 0.272
86 20,505,529 20,701,154 19,144,212 92.48% 0.034 -0.044
87 20,706,351 20,528,360 20,156,147 98.19% 0.001 -0.017
88 20,439,360 20,534,502 20,199,193 98.37% -0.008 -0.024
Maximum: 1.028 0.289 0.272





Avg absolute: 0.987 0.076 0.081







Std Err of Y Est 0.0258
R Squared 0.9516
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.9568
Std Err of Coef,
0.0719
90
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 15,332,325 15,234,171 14,927,774
78 14,913,554 14,880,598 14,264,657 95.86% -0.029 -0.070
79 15,012,384 14,914,230 14,722,985 98.72% 0.000 -0.013
80 14, 681,178 14,299,345 13,811,628 96.59% -0.047 -0.080
81 15,827,225 15,862,263 15,611,091 98.42% 0.080 0.063
82 18,044, 661 18,357,677 18,152,942 98.88% 0.160 0.147
83 18,921,438 19,907,778 18,761,010 94.24% 0.103 0.040
84 20,121,816 20,601,867 19,900,637 96.60% 0.089 0.052
85 21,215,302 22,222,053 20,995,641 94.48% 0.104 0.043
86 22,979,726 22,956,941 21,575,335 93.98% 0.082 0.017
87 22,548,280 23,543,155 22,087,589 93.82% 0.025 -0.039




Minimum: 0.938 -0.047 -0.080
Average 0.960 0.053 0.011










Std Err of Y Est 0.0224
R Squared 0.9007
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
0.9948
Std Err of Coef.
0.1101
91
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE (BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 18,327,568 18,258,930 18,078,178
78 19,342,031 19,088,437 18,828,011 98.64% 0.042 0.027
79 19,098,845 19,129,381 18,883,864 98.72% -0.011 -0.024
80 18,932,435 18,890,996 18,487,596 97.86% -0.011 -0.032
81 21,874,802 21,431,573 21,398,902 99.85% 0.132 0.130
82 23,369,736 23,673,551 23,401,604 98.85% 0.082 0.070
83 24,971,773 26,212,857 24, 955,265 95.20% 0.122 0.068
84 25,876,462 26,372,929 25,605,389 97.09% 0.056 0.025
85 28,891,254 29,933,203 28,642,081 95.69% 0.157 0.107
86 28,507,696 29,332,234 27,830,666 94.88% 0.015 -0.037
87 25,707,628 28,338,114 25,305,763 89.30% -0.006 -0.112
88 25,601,881 26,580,489 24,454,939 92.00% 0.034 -0.049
Maximum: 0.998 0.157 0.130














Std Err of Y Est 0.0339
R Squared 0.8101
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
1.1054
Std Err of Coef.
0.1784
92
OPERATION 6 MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE (BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 1,134,774 1,096,957 1,075,955
78 1,112,913 1,114,967 1,078,913 96.77% -0.017 -0.049
79 1,188,499 1,201,906 1,183,977 98.51% 0.080 0.064
80 1,140, 334 1,064, 912 1,117,211 104.91% -0.104 -0.060
81 1,307,204 1, 313,600 1,273,338 96.94% 0.152 0.117
82 1,422, 912 1,420,739 1,431,120 100.73% 0.087 0.095
83 1,739,845 1,754,232 1,754,080 99.99% 0.233 0.233
84 1,807,025 1,814,352 1,778,996 98.05% 0.043 0.023
85 1,882,648 1,919,340 1,870,560 97.46% 0.062 0.035
86 1,894,770 1,895,850 1,832,916 96.68% 0.007 -0.026
87 1,996,293 2,056,371 1,978,764 96.23% 0.085 0.044




Minimum: 0.948 -0.104 -0.060
Average 0.983 0.057 0.038










Std Err of Y Est 0.0280
R Squared 0.9101
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
0.9441
Std Err of Coef,
0.0989
93
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 15,592,204 15,544,699 15,322,391
78 15,281, 947 15,047,518 14,607,920 97.08% -0.035 -0.063
79 15,098,827 15,207,882 14,929,737 98.17% -0.005 -0.023
80 14,863,142 14,979,245 14,569,926 97.27% -0.008 -0.035
81 17,490,545 16,701,707 17,264,137 103.37% 0.124 0.162
82 19,339,231 20,154,606 19,410,573 96.31% 0.152 0.110
83 20,160,297 21,243,874 20,025,768 94.27% 0.098 0.035
84 20,637,217 21,295,333 20,506,295 96.29% 0.056 0.017
85 21,910,668 23,075,037 21,773,594 94.36% 0.118 0.055
86 22,940,919 23,791,245 22,213,545 93.37% 0.086 0.014
87 20,888,884 23,402,648 20,559,091 87.85% 0.020 -0.104
88 20, 626,454 22,096,448 20,372,446 92.20% 0.058 -0.025
Maximum: 1.034 0.152 0.162
Minimum: 0.878 -0.035 -0.104
Average: 0.955 0.060 0.013










Std Err of Y Est 0.0436
R Squared 0.7062
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
1.0463




(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 1,081,815 1,100,436 1,073,494
78 1,188,435 1,198,523 1,183,751 98.77% 0.108 0.094
79 1,547,766 1,658,735 1,547,766 93.31% 0.396 0.302
80 1,403,745 1,396,900 1,419,686 101.63% -0.097 -0.083
81 1,461,706 1,267,518 1,461,706 115.32% -0.097 0.041
82 2,469,200 2,419,717 2,437,317 100.73% 0.655 0.667
83 3,029,689 3,345,004 3,053,444 91.28% 0.355 0.237
84 3,858,142 4,055,988 3,788,364 93.40% 0.339 0.250
85 4,304,479 4,583,533 4,506,461 98.32% 0.188 0.168
86 3,920,898 4,253,207 3,902,769 91.76% -0.012 -0.093
87 3,015,172 3,494,136 2,954,813 84.56% -0.109 -0.246




Minimum: 0.846 -0.119 -0.246
Average 0.977 0.146 0.115










Std Err of Y Est 0.0835
R Squared 0.9004
No, of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9




(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 964,739 1,094,295 985, 341
78 967,182 813,547 967,182 118.88% -0.157 0.003
79 1,200,945 1,260,104 1,200,945 95.31% 0.303 0.242
80 1,715,867 1,845,756 1,683,838 91.23% 0.537 0.402
81 2,063,824 2,056,491 2,063,824 100.36% 0.199 0.203
82 2,748,629 2,818,773 2,718,021 96.43% 0.366 0.317
83 2,761,116 3,467,657 2,785,967 80.34% 0.262 0.014
84 3,328,736 3,607,379 3,332,508 92.38% 0.306 0.207
85 3,620,257 3, 936,421 3,621,498 92.00% 0.183 0.088
86 3,327,625 3,694,674 3,063,048 82.90% 0.021 -0.154
87 2,188,168 2, 684, 973 2,360,214 87.90% -0.193 -0.291
88 2,352,360 2,551,627 2,408,341 94.38% 0.166 0.101
Maximum: 1.189 0.537 0.402














Std Err of Y Est 0.1009
R Squared 0.7788
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
0.8217
Std Err of Coef,
0.1460
96
PROCUBEMENT OF WEAPONS AND TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, ARMY
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 2,237,718 2,273,970 2,213,946
78 2,560,259 2,975,500 2,560,259 86.04% 0.330 0.144
79 2,462,679 2,667,210 2,462,679 92.33% 0.042 -0.038
80 2,692,989 2,788,044 2,710,258 97.21% 0.132 0.101
81 3,506,518 3,420,695 3,506,518 102.51% 0.270 0.302
82 4,943,630 4,918,633 4,878,459 99.18% 0.403 0.391
83 5,723,652 6,120,703 5,786,510 94.54% 0.238 0.170
84 5,496,267 5,764,281 5,590,645 96.99% 0.007 -0.023
85 5,718,885 5,823,556 5,200,800 89.31% 0.060 -0.054
86 4,981,343 6,266,806 5,188,040 82.79% 0.096 -0.093
87 3,837,581 4,587,422 4,068,770 88.69% -0.079 -0.183




Minimum: 0.828 -0.109 -0.183
Average 0.933 0.126 0.053










Std Err of Y Est 0.0737
R Squared 0.8562
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
1.0276
Std Err of Coef,
0.1404
97
PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, ARMY
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 1,802,100 1,804,279 1,788, 629
78 2,278,869 2,430,013 2,228,067 91.69% 0.348 0.236
79 2,034,061 2,314,374 2,034,061 87.89% 0.016 -0.107
80 1,819,631 1,982,878 1,819,631 91.77% -0.025 -0.105
81 2,079,033 2,057,442 2,079,033 101.05% 0.131 0.143
82 2,936,488 2,910,981 3,037,750 104.35% 0.400 0.461
83 2, 584, 960 3,198,543 2,585,448 80.83% 0.089 -0.120
84 2,286,539 2,724,174 2,333,923 85.67% 0.054 -0.097
85 2, 998,111 2,851,915 3,026,072 106.11% 0.247 0.323
86 2,681,601 2,887,615 2,765,449 95.77% -0.037 -0.078
87 2,259,152 2,311,488 2,232,246 96.57% -0.138 -0.168




Minimum: 0.808 -0.138 -0.168
Average 0.950 0.099 0.048










Std Err of Y Est 0.0944
R Squared 0.8220
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
1.1403




(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 2,760,697 2,808,835 2,707,211
78 2,554,540 2,708,341 2,532,922 93.52% -0.019 -0.083
79 2,741,607 2,915,906 2,741,607 94.02% 0.141 0.073
80 2,147,321 2,500,664 2,188,059 87.50% -0.088 -0.202
81 3,019,633 3,152,951 3,019,633 95.77% 0.468 0.406
82 4,726,273 4,698,125 4,746,807 101.04% 0.556 0.572
83 5,004,634 5, 635,024 5,023,028 89.14% 0.192 0.063
84 5,480,820 6,209,190 5,516,888 88.85% 0.241 0.102
85 5,758,113 6,886,678 5,857,576 85.06% 0.257 0.069
86 5,540,852 6,074,868 5,836,718 96.08% 0.055 0.014
87 5,147,323 6,104,484 5,474,601 89.68% 0.102 -0.012




Minimum: 0.851 -0.088 -0.202
Average 0.919 0.185 0.093










Std Err of Y Est 0.0552
R Squared 0.9416
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
1.0925




(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 5,765, 452 6,007,330 5,632,924
78 6,267, 339 6,484,597 6,267,339 96.65% 0.125 0.087
79 7,103, 488 6,647,327 7,103,488 106.86% 0.061 0.133
80 6,536, 894 5,856,679 6,555,640 111.93% -0.176 -0.077
81 8,298, 081 6,810,565 8,298,081 121.84% 0.042 0.269
82 11,656, 676 11,789,950 11,625,813 98.61% 0.421 0.401
83 12,508, 621 14,109,270 12,688,643 89.93% 0.210 0.089
84 11,980, 915 12,998,939 11,992,702 92.26% 0.039 -0.041
85 12,631, 825 13,120,869 12,468,608 95.03% 0.095 0.041
86 11,744, 854 13,059,612 12,376,166 94.77% 0.034 -0.020
87 10,570, 067 12,231,079 10,475,147 85.64% 0.041 -0.108
88 8,943, 127 10,268,239 9,833,023 95.76% -0.029 -0.070
Maximum: 1.218 0.421 0.401














Std Err of Y Est 0.1098
R Squared 0.5625
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.7969






(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 4,051,506 4,436,807 4,005,943
78 4,025,581 4,250,405 4,025,581 94.71% 0.049 -0.006
79 3,187,093 3,336,864 3,187,093 95.51% -0.171 -0.208
80 2,896,257 2,912,915 2,946,884 101.17% -0.086 -0.075
81 3,718,267 3,060,158 3,756,150 122.74% 0.057 0.297
82 4,100,370 4,187,986 4,090,167 97.66% 0.126 0.100
83 4,184,554 4,752,832 4,338,775 91.29% 0.159 0.058
84 4,443,162 4,706,035 4,430,179 94.14% 0.125 0.059
85 5,066,034 5,318,308 4,958,961 93.24% 0.197 0.116
86 5,420,550 5,709,031 5,556,251 97.32% 0.127 0.097
87 5,438, 598 6,163,361 5,547,430 90.01% 0.137 0.023




Minimum: 0.900 -0.171 -0.208
Average 0.979 0.078 0.054










Std Err of Y Est 0.0976
R Squared 0.4749
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.7859
Std Err of Coef.
0.2755
101
SHIPBUILDING & CONVERSION, NAVY
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 12,272, 187 14,388,867 12,272,187
78 10,453, 072 10,684,922 10,453,072 97.83% -0.129 -0.148
79 6,127, 119 7,679,922 6,127,119 79.78% -0.265 -0.414
80 9,863, 247 9,112,620 9,812,620 107.68% 0.487 0.602
81 10,162, 412 8,391,092 10,162,412 121.11% -0.149 0.030
82 11,017, 600 10,808, 953 11,400,204 105.47% 0.064 0.122
83 19,793, 032 22,716,896 19,841,515 87.34% 1.062 0.801
84 13,480, 669 14,834,748 13,322,136 89.80% -0.251 -0.327
85 12,900, 823 15,027,902 13,420,240 89.30% 0.115 -0.004
86 10,515, 690 12,413,719 11,737,209 94.55% -0.038 -0.090
87 10,573, 033 12,807,494 10,788,224 84.23% 0.218 0.026
88 15,346, 698 11, 121, 412 16,682,523 150.00% 0.052 0.578
Maximum: 1.500 1.062 0.801














Std Err of Y Est 0.2225
R Squared 0.7100
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.8578




(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 4,356,577 4,343,899 4,305,468
78 3,938,768 4,000,360 3,938,768 98.46% -0.082 -0.096
79 4,305,085 4,414,276 4,305,085 97.53% 0.121 0.093
80 3,874,179 3,977,122 3,874,179 97.41% -0.076 -0.100
81 4,125,010 4,348,032 4,125,010 94.87% 0.122 0.065
82 4,688,913 4,874,378 4,729,980 97.04% 0.182 0.147
83 4,450,329 4,835,371 4,540,230 93.90% 0.031 -0.032
84 5,085,506 5,760,845 4,924,187 85.48% 0.294 0.106
85 6,475,911 6,808,348 6,049,873 88.86% 0.339 0.190
86 6,601,586 6,888,568 6,779,214 98.41% 0.064 0.047
87 6,910,253 7,127,313 6,323,071 88.72% 0.080 -0.042




Minimum: 0.855 -0.219 -0.272
Average: 0.940 0.078 0.010










Std Err of Y Est 0.0471
R Sc[uared 0.8885
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.7681




(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE (BASE) REQUEST APPRI"N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 633,518 668,978 650, 555
78 811,025 828,680 811, 025 97.87% 0.308 0.280
79 580,183 606,095 580, 183 95.72% -0.253 -0.285
80 418,871 419,483 418, 871 99.85% -0.277 -0.278
81 661,071 840,061 661, 071 78.69% 1.006 0.578
82 2,,182,701 2,212,621 2,182, 701 98.65% 2.347 2.302
83 2,.408,799 2,802,656 2,446, 197 87.28% 0.284 0.121
84 2,.052,459 2,162,953 2,052, 459 94.89% -0.102 -0.148
85 2,.149,799 2,262,528 2,100, 311 92.83% 0.102 0.023
86 1..854,889 1,931,167 1,839, 165 95.24% -0.102 -0.144
87 1,,672,252 1,716,384 1,567, 075 91.30% -0.075 -0.155



























Std Err of Y Est 0.1193
R Squared 0.9771
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
0.9541
Std Err of Coef,
0.0487
104
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE (BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 12,179,279 12,568,938 12,062,599
78 11,243,920 11,068,276 11,342,821 102.48% -0.091 -0.069
79 11,221,002 11,241,362 11,234,203 99.94% 0.000 -0.001
80 11,929,418 11,706,568 11,933,638 101.94% 0.043 0.064
81 13,137,076 11,751,960 13,137,076 111.79% -0.015 0.101
82 17,603,364 17,655,781 17,624,025 99.82% 0.344 0.342
83 21,434,158 21,725,911 21,718,236 99.96% 0.234 0.234
84 25,209,465 26,527,805 25,212,529 95.04% 0.238 0.176
85 28,385,549 32,791,881 29,946,559 91.32% 0.301 0.188
86 23,999,472 28,340,471 25,753,515 90.87% -0.002 -0.093
87 19,342,572 21,418,024 18,322,226 85.55% -0.108 -0.237




Minimum: 0.831 -0.168 -0.308
Average 0.965 0.071 0.036
/










Std Err of Y Est 0.0831
R Squared 0.8455
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
1.0382
Std Err of Coef,
0.1479
105
MISSILE PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 3,692, 552 3,796,355 3, 686, 609
78 3,135, 111 3,429,472 3,143,938 91.67% -0.071 -0.149
79 2,466, 591 2,732,725 2,574,641 94.22% -0.128 -0.179
80 3,222, 118 3,400,148 3,210,900 94.43% 0.378 0.302
81 4,265, 232 4,179,229 4,265,232 102.06% 0.297 0.324
82 5,833, 376 5,362,385 5,815,011 108.44% 0.257 0.363
83 6,040, 565 8,278,597 6,037,398 72.93% 0.419 0.035
84 9,207, 730 9,499,210 9,197,122 96.82% 0.573 0.523
85 8,749, 306 11,229,960 9,616,061 85.63% 0.220 0.044
86 8,213, 173 11,168, 647 9,205,362 82.42% 0.277 0.052
87 8,492, 067 9,023, 411 7, 964,404 88.26% 0.099 -0.030
88 7,925, 951 9,660,944 7,528, 677 77.93% 0.138 -0.113
Maximum: 1.084 0.573 0.523














Std Err of Y Est 0.1432
R Squared 0.6643
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9




OTHER PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 4,549,525 4,803,685 4,575,475
78 4,194,280 4,462,259 4,219,321 94.56% -0.019 -0.073
79 3,900,994 4,100,554 3,910,121 95.36% -0.022 -0.068
80 3,885,965 3,947,011 3,907,942 99.01% 0.012 0.002
81 4,073,020 4,424,058 4,073,020 92.07% 0.138 0.048
82 6,844,067 6,598,832 6,844,067 103.72% 0.620 0.680
83 6,749,836 7, 109, 514 6,783,701 95.42% 0.039 -0.009
84 8,128,167 8,799,165 8,149,731 92.62% 0.304 0.207
85 9,567,684 10,933,676 10,133,444 92.68% 0.345 0.247
86 8,381,659 10,188,958 9,161,000 89.91% 0.065 -0.043
87 9,664,147 10,744,079 9,898,333 92.13% 0.282 0.181




Minimum: 0.899 -0.072 -0.144
Average 0.945 0.154 0.094










Std Err of Y Est 0.0502
R Squared 0.9579
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
1.0745
Std Err of Coef,
0.0751
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RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, & EVALUATION, ARMY
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
11 4,374,866 4, 528,747 4,328,745
78 4,241, 935 4,423,961 4,241,154 95.87% 0.011 -0.031
79 4,225,495 4,362, 616 4,225,495 96.86% 0.028 -0.004
80 4,137,314 4,256,216 4,152,001 97.55% 0.007 -0.017
81 4,132,205 4,329,964 4,132,205 95.43% 0.047 -0.001
82 4,575,402 4,776,905 4,575,402 95.78% 0.156 0.107
83 4,747, 963 5,504,155 4,741,729 86.15% 0.203 0.036
84 5,022,256 5,555,005 4,951,214 89.13% 0.170 0.043
85 5,031,515 5,705,411 4,975,420 87.21% 0.136 -0.009
86 5,137,171 5,780,908 5,344,962 92.46% 0.149 0.062
87 5,074,559 5,892,081 4,911,682 83.36% 0.147 -0.044




Minimum: 0.834 0.007 -0.044
Average 0.914 0.106 0.009










Std Err of Y Est 0.0433
R Squared 0.2576
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9




RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, & EVALUATION, NAVY
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 7,212,744 7,696,337 7,065,462
78 7,054,536 7,389,756 7,001,914 94.75% 0.025 -0.029
79 7,187,995 7,198,621 7,187,995 99.85% 0.020 0.019
80 6,639,551 6,520,285 6,621,083 101.55% -0.093 -0.079
81 6,553,024 6,509,878 6,515,679 100.09% -0.020 -0.019
82 7,361,036 7,460,373 7,408,236 99.30% 0.138 0.131
83 7,438,317 7,591,542 7,291,311 96.05% 0.031 -0.009
84 8,927,860 9,503,293 8,913,829 93.80% 0.278 0.198
85 10,524,177 11,241,364 10,493,790 93.35% 0.259 0.175
86 11,144,522 12,428,239 11,212,252 90.22% 0.181 0.065
87 10,071,615 11,383,137 10,054,353 88.33% 0.021 -0.098




Minimum: 0.883 -0.093 -0.098
Average: 0.953 0.083 0.030










Std Err of Y Est 0.0438
R Squared 0.8264
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coefficient (s)
0.7747




RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, & EVALUATION, AIR FORCE
(CONSTANT FY 89 $ 000)
% REQ % INC % INC
FY CSE(BASE) REQUEST APPRT'N APPRT'D REQ'D APPRT'D
77 7,224,217 7,448,472 7,116,208
78 6,933,285 7, 950,184 6,872,068 86.44% 0.100 -0.049
79 6,750,625 6,955,915 6,622,379 95.20% 0.003 -0.045
80 7,308,466 7,358,005 7,304,309 99.27% 0.090 0.082
81 9,070,697 9,415,519 9,068,288 96.31% 0.288 0.241
82 11,179,250 11,184,434 10,862,733 97.12% 0.233 0.198
83 12,986,508 13,778,416 13,017,185 94.48% 0.232 0.164
84 14,409,511 15,070,389 14,417,764 95.67% 0.160 0.110
85 15,824,804 16,476,324 15,357,679 93.21% 0.143 0.066
86 14,743,896 17,215,289 15,281,506 88.77% 0.088 -0.034
87 16,431,306 18,095,864 16,238,447 89.74% 0.227 0.101




Minimum: 0.821 0.003 -0.054
Average 0.926 0.156 0.071










Std Err of Y Est 0.0620
R Squared 0.6872
No. of Observations 11
Degrees of Freedom 9
X Coef ficient (s)
1.0421
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Appropriation Act - a statute, under the jurisdiction of the House
and Senate Appropriations Committees, that generally provides
authority for Federal agencies to incur obligations and to make
payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes. An
appropriations act is the most common means of providing budget
authority. Currently there are 13 regular appropriations acts for
each fiscal year. From time to time. Congress also enacts
supplemental appropriation acts.
Appropriations Committee - a standing committee in either the House
or the Senate with jurisdiction over governmental funding.
Armed Services Committee - either of the two authorizations
committees in the House or Senate with cognizance over the
Department of Defense and other national defense matters; see
House/Senate Armed Services Committee.
Assertiveness - the tendency for agencies to pursue an active
strategy of expansion in their programs and fundings, quantified in
this thesis as the percentage increment requested over the current
services baseline.
Autocorrelation - the statistical phenomena when the error terms or
residuals from different points in time are correlated.
Authorizing Committee - a committee of the House or Senate with
legislative jurisdiction over laws that set up or continue the
operations of federal programs and provide the legal basis for
making appropriations for those programs.
Authorizing Legislation - legislation enacted by Congress that sets
up or continues the operation of a federal program or agency
indefinitely or for a specific period of time. Authorizing
legislation may place a cap on the amount of budget authority which
can be appropriated for a program or may authorize the
appropriation of "such sums as are necessary."
Base - a starting point for budget formulation that encompasses
commonly shared beliefs by all concerned parties.
"Definitions have been taken directly or adopted from the following
sources: Bohrnstedt (1988), Giordano (1985), Goehlert (1979), Morse (1986),
Ostrom (1978), Pfaf fenberger (1987), U.S. General Accounting Office (1981),
U.S. Senate Budget Committee (1985, 1988), and Wildavsky (1988).
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Baseline - a set of projections showing the levels of spending and
revenues that would occur for the upcoming fiscal year and beyond
if existing programs and policies are continued unchanged, with all
programs adjusted for inflation so that existing levels of activity
are maintained; also called the current services or current policy
baseline
.
Biennial Budget - a two-year budget; DoD was first directed to
submit a biennial budget by the DoD Authorization Act of 1987.
Bill - proposed legislation that may originate in either chamber,
except revenue-raising bills, which must be introduced in the
House. If a bill is not passed by the end of the two-year
congressional term, it must be reintroduced the following Congress.
Budget - a formal plan of action or list of goals expressed in
monetary terms.
Budget Amendment - a revision to some aspect of the standing budget
request, submitted to Congress by the President before Congress
completes appropriation action.
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 - created the Bureau of the
Budget (since 1970, called the Office of Management and Budget) and
the General Accounting Office.
Budget Authority - authority provided by law to enter into
obligations which will result in immediate or future outlays
(payments) involving Government funds.
Budget Committee - established by Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974; see House/Senate Budget Committee.
Budget Year (BY) - the fiscal year for which the proposed budget is
presented; Current Year + 1
.
Calendar Year (CY) - 1 January to 31 December.
Claimant - major activity within an agency that receives an
allocation of funds from the appropriation.
Coefficient of Determination (r^) - a measure of the proportion of
the total variation in the dependent variable explained by the
regression.
Concurrent Resolution - used for matters affecting the business of
both houses. They do not require the signature of the President
nor do they have effect of law.
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Concurrent Resolution on the Budget - a concurrent resolution that
Congress is to adopt before 15 April which sets forth appropriate
levels for the upcoming fiscal year for, among other things, budget
authority and budget outlays for each major functional category,
and total revenues.
Conference Committee - a joint committee composed of selected
members from the House and Senate to resolve differences in passed
bills.
Congressional Budget - the budget as set forth by Congress in a
Concurrent Resolution on the Budget.
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
established 1) a new Congressional budget process; 2) Committees on
the Budget in each House; 3) a Congressional Budget Office; and 4)
a procedure providing Congress control over the impoundment of
funds by the executive branch.
Continuing Resolution - appropriations legislation enacted by
Congress to provide temporary budget authority for federal agencies
to keep them in operation when their regular appropriation bill has
not been enacted by the start of the fiscal year. A continuing
resolution is a joint resolution, which has the same legal status
as a bill. It frequently specifies a maximum rate at which
obligations may be incurred, based on the rate of the prior year,
the President's budget request, or an appropriation bill passed by
either or both chambers of Congress. A continuing resolution is a
form of appropriation act and should not be confused with the
budget resolution.
Continuous Variable - a variable that, in theory, can take on all
possible numerical values in a given interval
.
Cross-Sectional Analysis - an analysis of observations taken during
a single period across a number of events
.
Current Services Estimate - that amount required to continue
federal programs and activities without policy changes from the
fiscal year in progress.
Current Year (CY) - the fiscal year in which the budget is executed
and immediately preceding the budget year.
Deficit - the amount by which total budget outlays for a fiscal
year exceed total revenues for that fiscal year; includes the
Social Security trust funds and other off-budget federal entities
for purposes of calculation.
Deflator - a price index used to adjust data for inflation.
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Dependent Variable - a variable that is affected by an independent
variable
.
Direct program - that program funding that directly supports the
mission; total direct program is the subtotal for total obligation
authority before adding reimbursable programs
.
Fiscal Year (FY) - 12 month period used for accounting and
financial reporting; it does not have to coincide with the calendar
year. The U.S. Government's fiscal year runs from 1 October to 30
September. Prior to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the
fiscal year was 1 July to 30 June (FY 76 ended 30 June 1976; FY 77
began 1 October 197 6)
.
Fiscal Illusion - the phenomena of noticing a change in prices
without considering the cause to be a general change in price
levels, i.e., inflation.
Function - one of 19 categories into which the U.S. budget is
broken down, e.g.. National Defense, Agriculture, Medicare.
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) - The Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Title II of Public Law 99 - 177, as
amended by PL 100-119) ; jokingly referred to by the authors as a
"bad law whose time has come"; ostensibly forces the legislative
and executive branch to eliminate the federal budget deficit by FY
1993 by across-the-board cuts if agreement cannot be reached.
House Appropriations Committee (MAC) - consists of 57 Members; must
report annual appropriations bills for the upcoming year by 10
June
.
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) - consists of 51 Members.
House Budget Committee - consists of 23 Members as follows:
• 5 from the Appropriations Committee
• 5 from the Committee on Ways and Means
• 11 from other standing committees
• 1 each from the leadership of the majority and minority
parties. Membership is limited to no more than two Congresses (4
years) in any period of five successive Congresses (10 years)
.
Impoundment - a generic term referring to any action or inaction by
an officer or employee of the U.S. Government that precludes the
obligation or expenditure of budget authority in the manner
intended by Congress.
Independent Variable - a variable that has a causal role in
relation to a dependent variable.
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Interquartile Range - the lower quartile of a set of measurements
is the 25th percentile (that value at which 25% of the measurements
fall below, when ordered from largest to smallest) ; the upper
quartile is the 75th percentile. The interquartile range is the
difference between the lower and upper quartiles. The larger the
interquartile range is for a data set, the more variable (spread
out) the set of measurements is.
Lapse - that part of budget authority that is not obligated during
the specific period of time it is made available by Congress and
thus expires.
Least-Squares Criterion - a mathematical criterion specifying that
the sum of the squared vertical differences between observed data
and a line representing an equation developed using regression
analysis be minimized; also called ordinary least squares.
Linear Regression - an analytical method in which the mathematical
criterion of least squares is used to fit an equation for a
straight line through a number of paired observations.
Model - a simplified representation of a real world phenomenon.
Multiple Regression Analysis - a statistical technique for
estimating the relationship between a continuous dependent variable
and two or more continuous or discrete independent variables.
Multiple Regression Coefficient - a measure of association showing
the amount of increase or decrease in a continuous dependent
variable for a one-unit difference in the independent variable,
controlling for the other independent variables in the equations.
New Obligation Authority (NOA) - the additional amount Congress
appropriates for a program, over and above earlier appropriations.
Obligation - an action that will result in an outlay. Obligations
include current liabilities for salaries, wages, and interest;
contracts for the purchase of supplies and equipment, construction,
and the acquisition of office space, buildings, and land; and other
arrangements requiring the payment of money.
Office of Management and Budget - the President's office for
governmental oversight of all executive agencies (formerly Bureau
of the Budget)
.
Outlay - expenditures and net lending of funds under budget
authority during a fiscal year.
Parameter - a numerical measure of a population characteristic.
Past Year (PY) - the fiscal year immediately preceding the current
year; the last completed fiscal year.
127
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) - an integrated
system for the establishment, maintenance, and revision of the DoD
budget; it combines policy formulation with budgetary allocation
and provides a mechanism for analysis.
President' s Budget - the document sent to Congress by the President
in January of each year, requesting new budget authority for
federal programs and estimating federal revenues and outlays for
the upcoming fiscal year.
R^ - see Coefficient of Determination.
Range - a measure of dispersion based on the difference between the
largest and smallest values in a distribution.
Real - dollars after adjusting for inflation; constant.
Reappropriation - Congressional action that extends the
availability of unobligated amounts that have expired (lapsed) or
would otherwise expire.
Reclama - a formal challenge or appeal by a subordinate activity to
a proposed or actual change (usually downward) to its budget
request by its superior.
Regression Model - an equation for the linear relationship between
a continuous dependent variable and one or more independent
variables, plus an error term.
Reprogramming - utilization of funds within an appropriation
account for purposes other than those contemplated at the time of
appropriation; depending on the various threshold amounts, may
require Congressional notification or approval.
Resolution - a measure concerning only the business or sentiments
of a single house, having no legislative effect outside the house
in which they originate. Resolutions become operative upon passage
by that house and do not require approval by the other house or the
signature of the President.
5catterp2ot - a type of diagram that displays the association of
two continuous variables as a set of points on a Cartesian
coordinate system.
Senate Appropriations Committee - consists of 29 Members.
Senate Armed Services Committee - consists of 20 Members.
Senate Budget Committee - consists of 24 Members; must report
Concurrent Resolution on the Budget by 1 April.
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Simple Linear Regression - a type of linear regression in which
there is only one independent variable.
Success - for purposes of determining budget success as defined in
this thesis, the amount appropriated over the baseline estimate,
expressed as a percentage.
Supplemental Appropriation - An act appropriating funds in addition
to those in the 13 regular annual appropriation acts; it provides
additional budget authority beyond the original estimates for
programs or activities (including new programs authorized after the
date of the original appropriation act) in cases where the need for
funds is too urgent to be postponed until enactment of the next
regular appropriation bill.
t-ratio - a statistical measure used to assess the precision and
significance of individual variables.
Total Direct Program - see direct program.
Total Obligation Authority (TOA) - a DoD financial term which ex-
presses the value of the direct defense program for a fiscal year.
Transfer - when specifically authorized in law, all or part of the
budget authority in one appropriation account may be transferred to
another account
.
Transition Quarter (TQ) - the 3-month period between the end of
FY 1976 and the beginning of FY 1977 resulting from the change from
a 1 July through 30 June fiscal year to a 1 October through
30 September fiscal year beginning with FY 1977 (1 July to
30 September 1976)
.
Turbulence - the annual variations about the long-term mean level
of funding actually appropriated by Congress.
Variable - a characteristic of an event that differs in value
across such events.
Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) - a process emphasizing management's
responsibility to plan, budget, and evaluate. ZBB provides for
analysis of alternative methods of operation at various levels of
effort, including the possibility that the activity in question
will not be funded at all. It places new programs on an equal
footing with existing programs by requiring that program priorities
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